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AND REPUTATION OF THE BAR
RUSSELL G. PEARCE*
As "professionals," lawyers historically have achieved autonomy from external reg-
ulation distinguishing themselves from businesspersons because their commitment
to clients and to public service surpassed their financial self-interesL Recently, how-
ever, commentators have lamented the decline of professionalism in the legal ser-
vices industry. In this Articll Professor Pearce identifies this shift as a time for
hope rather than as a cause for despair. Applying Thomas S. Kumn's theory of
paradigm shifts, Professor Pearce traces the transformation of law practice from a
profession to a business. Explaining that the crisis created by the proliferation of
business activities in law practice cannot be reconciled with the Professionalism
Paradigm, he predicts that a Business Paradigm is emerging. Professor Pearce con-
cludes by suggesting an approach to the Business Paradigm midway between a pure
market approach and the re-creation of the status quo. This "Middle Range" ap-
proach would continue bar admission while permitting nonlawyers to practice law
and substituting market and government regulation for self-regulation. Professor
Pearce argues that this approach will likely free law practice of the taint of hypoc-
risy, foster a realistic community ethic of commitment to the common good, and
improve the quality and delivery of legal services.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. B.A. 1978, J.D. 1981, Yale Univer-
sity. I am grateful to the following for their helpful responses to the ideas in this Article:
Tony Alfieri, Victor Brudney, Dan Capra, Frank Chiang, George Cochran, David Cole,
Mary Daly, Matt Diller, John Feerick, Jill Fisch, Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Monroe
Freedman, Paul Gore, Bruce Green, Abner Greene, Milton Handler, Geoff Hazard, Tracy
Higgins, Michele Hirshman, Nick Johnson, Greg Joseph, Bill Josephson, Bob Kaczorowski,
Jim Kainen, Mike Lanzarone, Maria Marcus, Peter Margulies, Mike Martin, Frank
Michelman, Martha Minow, Tom Morgan, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Joe Perillo, Richard
Posner, Joel Reidenberg, David Reiser, Dan Richman, Deborah Rhode, Michael Ruby,
Ted Schneyer, David Schoenbrod, Tom Shaffer, William Simon, Terry Smith, Linda Sugin,
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That we are at the end of an era is not something that can be proved
scientifically. One senses it or one does not. One knows by intu-
ition that the old images.., have lost their meaning.1
The policies eliminated here ... free us all to concentrate our efforts
on more important matters.2
INTRODUCTION
The legal profession is on the verge of a radical transformation.
In the past few years, the best and the brightest of the legal world
have chronicled the decline of professionalism and offered prescrip-
tions for its revival.3 As this Article demonstrates, this attention is but
one result of the loss of faith in the distinction between a business and
a profession (Business-Profession dichotomy) at the heart of the ex-
isting paradigm that organizes our beliefs and values about the deliv-
ery of legal services-what I call the "Professionalism Paradigm." But
while many commentators describe the current crisis as cause for de-
spair, this Article identifies it as a time for hope. The crisis presents
the legal community with an opportunity to move to a new paradigm
offering better service to clients and greater benefit to the public.
As the framework for its analysis of the crisis in professionalism,
the Article employs Thomas S. Kuhn's theory of paradigms. In his
classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,4 Kuhn described
how scientific communities, like other enterprises, use paradigms to
maintain conformity regarding the legitimacy of questions, methods,
and answers. Kuhn disputed the belief that scientific discoveries re-
sulted from the incremental and progressive increase of knowledge.
Instead, he demonstrated that such breakthroughs were relatively rare
phenomena occurring only when paradigms had broken down.
1 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradi-
tion at v (1983); see also Stephen P. Wink & Walter Wink, Domination, Justice and the
Cult of Violence, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 341, 377 (1993) (discussing Berman quote).
2 Elimination of Unnecessary Broadcast Regulation, 50 Fed. Reg. 5583, 5590 (1985)
(policy statement of the Federal Communications Commission explaining, inter alia, its
withdrawal from regulation of broadcast advertising on grounds that such regulation was
duplicative and beyond the agency's expertise). I would like to thank George Cochran and
Jimmy Robertson for drawing this wonderful quote to my attention.
3 See generally, e.g., Mary A. Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in
the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society (1994); Anthony T. Kronman, The
Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993); Sol M. Linowitz & Martin
Mayer, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
4 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970). Richard
Rorty has recently described this book as "the most influential English-language philoso-
phy book of the last half-century." Richard Rorty, Untruth and Consequences, New Re-
public, July 31, 1995, at 32, 33 (reviewing Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul
Feyerabend (1995)).
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Kuhn's concept of paradigms provides a valuable tool for explain-
ing the current state of legal professionalism and anticipating its fu-
ture. When viewed as a paradigm, legal professionalism determines
whether lawyer conduct is legitimate and provides the basis for law-
yers' exclusive privilege to provide legal services and their autonomy
from external regulation. Like a scientific paradigm, the Professional-
ism Paradigm is socially constructed. Its authority rests not on its
truth in any abstract sense, but in its acceptance by the relevant
community.
Created in the late nineteenth century in response to rising con-
cerns that entrepreneurial aspects of law were undermining the pro-
fession's reputation, the Professionalism Paradigm rests on a
purported bargain between the profession and society in which the
profession agreed to act for the good of clients and society in ex-
change for autonomy. The conditions that made this bargain possible
and necessary all require distinguishing a profession from a business.
Under the paradigm, lawyers differ from businesspersons in that they
possess esoteric knowledge inaccessible to lay persons. The paradigm
also holds that, in contrast to businesspersons, who maximize financial
self-interest, lawyers altruistically place the good of their clients and
the good of society above their own self-interest. The combination of
inaccessible knowledge and altruism makes both impractical and un-
necessary the outside regulation of public and market to which busi-
nesses are subject.5
Because lawyers have always earned their living selling their ser-
vices to private consumers on the market and because much of their
work involves representing the interests of businesses, the Profession-
alism Paradigm had to reconcile those business aspects of law practice
with the Business-Profession dichotomy that underlies the paradigm.
The paradigm's response was to make the profession responsible for
policing the dichotomy by subjecting business conduct to certain
taboos. This Article identifies these prohibitions as the "Profit Maxi-
mizer" and "Business Servant" taboos. The Profit Maximizer treats
law as a commodity by organizing practice like a business, openly
marketing services, and seeking large profits. The Business Servant
favors clients at the expense of society.6
The Professionalism Paradigm also explained why making a living
by selling legal services was not inconsistent with the dichotomy.
Lawyers' earning of money in exchange for their services was only
"incidental" in light of their higher commitment to the greater good.
5 See infra Part I.B.
6 See infra Part IL
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Under the paradigm, the invisible hand of reputation-not effi-
ciency-governed the market for legal services. Consumers who
could not understand the esoteric practice of law relied upon a law-
yer's reputation, which was earned in the self-policing legal profession
by demonstrating excellence and ethical character. When the conduct
of lawyers appeared inconsistent with the paradigm, the response was
to exhort them to compliance. When a critic challenged the Business-
Profession dichotomy and asserted that law was indeed a business, the
profession marginalized that perspective.7
Today, however, the widespread perception is that law practice
is a business. This perception so fundamentally undermines the
Business-Profession dichotomy that it has provoked a professional cri-
sis. Even the organized bar, the guardian of the Professionalism Para-
digm, has conceded that this conduct threatens the continued viability
of the paradigm.8
As Kuhn suggests, such a crisis can be resolved by one of three
innovations: The community can discover a new way to resolve the
anomaly using the existing paradigm; it can bracket the anomaly to be
resolved in the future; or it can replace the old paradigm with a new
one.9 The first two alternatives are not available here; the anomaly is
too fundamental to the paradigm. That leaves the third alternative.
A new paradigm should explain the anomaly and offer a compel-
ling account of the community's work. An emerging, and simple, new
paradigm satisfies this criteria: The practice of law is a business (Busi-
ness Paradigm). Implementation of the Business Paradigm is open to
a variety of approaches, ranging from recreation of the status quo to
nearly complete reliance upon the market. This Article proposes a
"Middle Range" approach between these two extremes: allowing
nonlawyers to provide legal services but retaining a role for the orga-
nized bar with bar membership serving as a certificate rather than a
license. The Middle Range approach also includes governmental reg-
ulation similar to existing rules for lawyer conduct and shared moral
commitment to the public good similar to the aspirations of the Pro-
fessionalism Paradigm.10
The Middle Range approach may very well improve the quality
of legal services, the administration of justice, and the contribution of
lawyers to the public good. Especially in light of the questionable per-
formance of lawyers under the Professionalism Paradigm, increased
competition would likely result in better quality services at a lower
7 See infra text accompanying notes 78-84.
8 See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Part IV.A.
10 See infra Part IV.B.
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cost. By making legal services more widely available to moderate and
low-income persons, competition would also contribute to improving
the administration of justice. While this advance would not fully re-
solve the tension between the societal aspiration of equal justice
under law and the absence of equal access to legal services, the Middle
Range approach places the tension squarely and unavoidably before
the public, who will hopefully address it.
The Middle Range approach would further promote respect for
the legal system by removing the taint of duplicity resulting from the
Professionalism Paradigm's assertions of lawyer altruism to a disbe-
lieving public. Removal of this taint would also facilitate the develop-
ment of a vision of public service that would have greater power to
influence the members of the legal community than the Professional-
ism Paradigm."
Part I of the Article provides an overview of Kuhn's theory of the
role of paradigms and describes how legal professionalism functions as
a. paradigm. Part 1I describes how in normal discourse the business
behavior of lawyers was a puzzle for resolution under the Profession-
alism Paradigm. Part III explains how lawyers' business behavior
changed from a puzzle within the paradigm to an anomaly that pro-
voked the present crisis. Part IV considers possible conclusions for
the crisis and suggests that the most probable result will be the emer-
gence of the Business Paradigm. It further describes how the Middle
Range approach to the Business Paradigm may actually do a better
job than the existing paradigm in meeting the goals of service to cli-
ents and the public.
I
THE PROFESSIONALISM PARADIGM
Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms explains how, except in rare
instances where a paradigm crisis occurs, socially constructed para-
digms shape a community's work and restrain inconsistent views. The
Professionalism Paradigm serves this function for the legal commu-
nity. The paradigm relies on the Business-Profession dichotomy to
provide the grounds both for normative assessment of lawyer conduct
and for the profession's control of the delivery of legal services.
A. Kuhn's Theory of Paradigms
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn demonstrates
that the work of science is socially constructed much like other human
11 See infra Part IV.B2.
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endeavors, such as art and politics.' 2 He rejects the notion that the
history of science reveals a logical, progressive, and incremental
growth in knowledge.13 Instead, he shows that emotional and other
nonrational factors play a major role in the development and accep-
tance of scientific discoveries. 14
Kuhn finds that scientific communities use paradigms to organize
their problem-solving efforts.' 5 In what Kuhn describes as "normal
science,"' 6 practitioners who "have undergone similar educations and
professional initiations"'17 use their shared paradigm as the determi-
12 See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 208 (noting that "[p]eriodization in terms of revolutionary
breaks and style, taste, and institutional structure" is common to science as well as litera-
ture, arts, and political developments); see also id. at 93 (discussing "genetic aspect of the
parallel between political and scientific development").
13 Id. at 208-09.
14 Commentators disagree as to whether Kuhn rejects the notion of preexisting reality
altogether. Compare, e.g., Joyce Appleby et al., Telling the Truth About History 165
(1994) (asserting that Kuhn "remained true to essentially realist assumptions about the
relationship between what the scientist can know and how scientific laws mirror nature")
with Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 254, 275, 307
(1992) (describing Kuhn as a postmodemist). Kuhn's comments on this point are equivo-
cal. Compare Kuhn, supra note 4, at 126 (finding it "impossible to relinquish entirely [the]
viewpoint" that "sensory experience [is] fixed and neutral") with id. at 172-73 (noting that
the development of scientific knowledge "may have occurred, as we now suppose biologi-
cal evolution did, without benefit of a set goal, a permanent fixed scientific truth"). This
Article need not resolve Kuhn's understanding of preexisting reality. Professionalism, un-
like the speed of light, is quite evidently a social construction.
15 Steven Winter notes that Kuhn acknowledges three different uses of the term "para-
digm." Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 639, 647
n.44 (1990). These are uses as a "disciplinary matrix," an "exemplar," and a "model." Id.;
see also Kuhn, supra note 4, at 174-91 (discussing "disciplinary matrix" and "exemplar");
Thomas S. Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in The Essential Tension: Selected Stud-
ies in Scientific Tradition and Change 293, 297-98 (1977) (describing use of paradigm as
"model").
A paradigm as disciplinary matrix is "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, tech-
niques, and so on shared by the members of a given community." Kuhn, supra note 4, at
175. A paradigm as exemplar is "one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete
puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a
basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science." Id. Finally, as models,
paradigms "provide the group with preferred analogies or, when deeply held, with an on-
tology." Kuhn, supra, at 297-98.
Like Winter, I will use "the term 'paradigm' to refer both to models and to disciplinary
matrices without pausing to distinguish between them." Winter, supra, at 647 n.44. In-
deed, professionalism provides both a constellation of beliefs and values and an ontology.
See infra Part I.B.
16 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 5, 144. Richard Rorty describes "normal science" as "the
practice of solving problems against the background of consensus about what counts as a
good explanation of the phenomena and about what it would take for a problem to be
solved." Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 320 (1979).
17 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 177.
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nant of "legitimate methods, problems, and standards of solution."' 8
In normal science, the community rejects ideas inconsistent with the
paradigm, often without even evaluating their significance. 19
At the same time that a paradigm constrains discourse, its
problem-solving nature ensures the paradigm's eventual demise.20
The task of problem-solving will inevitably result in identification of a
problem that is not susceptible to problem-solving efforts under the
paradigm.21 That problem becomes an "anomaly" that provokes a cri-
sis.?2 A time of crisis is one of "extraordinary science' 23 where the
paradigm itself comes into question.24 In this "period of pronounced
professional insecurity,"2s consensus regarding the constitution of the
governing paradigm disintegrates, proposals for new paradigms prolif-
erate, and the community "turns" to philosophy as it revisits first
principles.26
When the scientific community cannot resolve the crisis by solv-
ing the problem under the paradigm or bracketing the problem for the
18 Id. at 48. The paradigm "provides a map whose details are elucidated by mature
scientific research." Id. at 109.
19 In normal science, "the research worker is a solver of puzzles, not a tester of para-
digms." Id. at 144. Kuhn observed that "[n]ormal sciene ... often suppresses fundamen-
tal novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments." Id. at 5.
The community generally rejects research challenging or disregarding the paradigm "as
metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to
be worth the time." Id. at 37. The community even rejects ideas that may form the basis of
a later paradigm. Kuhn notes that in the transformations he studied, the new paradigms
"had been at least partially anticipated during a period when there was no crisis in the
corresponding science; and in the absence of crisis those anticipations had been ignored."
Id. at 75.
20 Id. at 181 (describing crisis as "a self-correcting mechanism which ensures that the
rigidity of normal science will not forever go unchallenged"); see also Frank Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 Yale LJ. 1493, 1523 (1988) (observing Kuhn's acknowledgment that
"normal-scientific practice is always in some degree nurturing the development of its own
impending transformation").
21 At some point, "a normal problem, one that ought to be solvable by known rules and
procedures, resists the reiterated onslaught of the ablest members of the group within
whose competence it falls." Kuhn, supra note 4, at 5. This problem can arise either from
influences inside or outside of the scientific community. Id. at 181.
2 See id. at 6 (noting that anomalies lead to scientific revolutions). At the point where
"an anomaly comes to seem more than just another puzzle of normal science, the transition
to crisis and to extraordinary science has begun." Id. at 82.
23 Id. at 82.
24 See id. at 82-83 (noting that "formerly standard solutions of solved problems are
called in question").
25 Id. at 67-68.
26 The crisis period involves "frequent and deep debates over legitimate methods,
problems, and standards of solution" that are "almost non-existent during periods of nor-
mal science." Id. at 47-48; see id. at 80-88 ("[I]n periods of acknowledged crisis... scien-
tists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their
field."); see also Winter, supra note 15, at 679-80 (quoting Kuhn).
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future, it replaces the old paradigm with a new one in what Kuhn calls
a revolution.27 The new paradigm proposes to "solve the problems
that have led the old one to a crisis. '28 Whether the new paradigm
succeeds in a revolution depends more on the power of conversion
than logical argument. 29 No "logical" choice is available between
competing paradigms that "disagree about what is a problem and
what a solution. o30 Newer members of the community tend to be
more open to new paradigms and more senior members tend to be
more resistant.31
Kuhn and other commentators have not limited this analysis to
scientific communities. Any definable community can possess a para-
digm. While asserting the uniqueness of scientific communitids, 2 '
27 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 84, 92.
28 Id. at 153. The new paradigm "need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts
with which it can be confronted." Id. at 18.
29 See id. at 151, 159 (discussing how new paradigms ultimately find favor through
change in generations, not from unqualified acceptance). Kuhn describes how scientists
"often speak of the 'scales falling from the eyes' or of the 'lightning flash' that 'inundates' a
previously obscure puzzle." Id. at 122; see also id. at 158 (explaining that conversion relies
on "faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it,
knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few"). Indeed, the old paradigm is
likely to offer advantages in problem solving. See id. at 154 (stating that, when proposed,
"Copernicus' theory was not more accurate than Ptolemy's").
30 Id. at 109. Without agreement on "evaluative procedures," "logic and experiment
alone" cannot establish the superiority of either paradigm. Id. at 94; see also William R.
Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 fIbl. L. Rev.
907, 909-10 (1988) (discussing how, under Kuhn's model of revolution, "scientific revolu-
tions are ... functions of nonrational faith").
31 The process of transforming the profession "begins with one or a few individuals"
whose perspective differs from "most other members of their profession." Kuhn, supra
note 4, at 144. For one, they have "intensely concentrated upon the crisis-provoking
problems." Id. In addition, they are "committed ... less deeply than most of their contem-
poraries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm" often because they
are "so young or so new" to the field. Id. The "first supporters" of the paradigm then
"develop it to the point where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied."
Id. at 158.
If these supporters succeed and "the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the
number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor will increase. More scientists
will be converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm will go on." Id. at 159. While
many established scientists will eventually "transfer allegiance" to the new paradigm "a
few at time, [some,] particularly the older and more experienced ones, may resist indefi-
nitely." Id. at 152. When "the last holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be
practicing under a single, but now a different, paradigm." Id. at 152. Kuhn quotes Max
Planck's observation "that 'a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its oppo.
nents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a
new generation grows up that is familiar with it."' Id. at 151 (quoting Max Planck, Scien-
tific Autobiography and Other Papers 33-34 (F. Gaynor trans., 1949)).
32 See id. at 209 (noting that although "scientific development may resemble that in
other fields ... it is also strikingly different"). In his view, the unique aspects of scientific
communities include their self-governance, the "special nature of scientific education" and
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Kin acknowledged the utility of his approach for analyzing change in
music, art, literature, and political development.3 3 Many legal schol-
ars have similarly applied Kuhn's analysis in areas as diverse as legal
history, legal theory, economics, constitutional law, and civil
procedure? 4
B. Applying Paradigm Theory to the Legal Profession
While commentators have previously used paradigm theory to
discuss specific areas of law,35 this Article applies it to professional-
ism. Unlike a scientific paradigm, in which practitioners take for
granted the truth of certain assumptions about the physical world, the
Professionalism Paradigm is self-referential. Although defining right
values, the "relative scarcity of competing schools," and the small size of the communities.
Id.
33 Indeed, in his view, he was borrowing "[the tool of p]eriodization in terms of revolu-
tionary breaks in style, taste, and institutional structure" from "[h]istorians of literature, of
music, of the arts, of political development, and of many other human activities." Id. at
208; see also id. at 92-94 (discussing parallels between political and scientific development).
34 In recent law reviews, at least 307 articles have referred to Thomas Kuhn. Search of
LEXIS, Lawrev library, Allrev file (Aug. 17, 1995). Scientific communities tend to be
smaller, more uniform in their views, and more insulated from public pressure than the
16gal community. See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 209 (noting "relative scarcity of competing
schools in the developed sciences"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science,
or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
Brook. L. Rev. 659,697-98 (1993) ("Law... is expected to be responsive to public concern
about perceived problems, while science is given more insulation from the current social
environment."). Nevertheless, the legal community "bears significant parallels to the sci-
entific community[,J" Winter, supra note 15, at 670 n.162, and even if it did not, Kuhn
acknowledges'that his approach applies broadly to political and other communities. Kuhn,
supra note 4, at 92-94,208. Accordingly, numerous legal scholars have found Kuhn's the-
ory helpful in explaining a wide variety of legal topics. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1, at
22 ("The interaction of revolution and evolution in Western law offers a striking parallel to
the interaction of revolution and evolution in Western science."); Richard A. Posner, Over-
coming Law 426 (1995) (describing "economics [as] increasingly a single field, utilizing a
common paradigm in Kuhn's sense"); Casto, supra note 30, at 909-10 (applying Kuhn's
analysis to development of the Erie doctrine); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Re-
visited: How To Marginalize Outsider XVriting, Ten Years Later, 140 U. Pa. L Rev. 1349,
1369 (1992) (describing transformation of legal scholarship as "[ilf not a full-fledged para-
digm shift, something similar"); Micheman, supra note 20, at 1522-23 (comparing Bruce
Ackerman's account of "constitutional politics" with Kuhn's analysis); Stempel, supra, at
661, 734 (observing that "the perceived post-1938 consensus attending adjudicatory proce-
dure and civil litigation reform" constitutes the equivalent of a paradigm that has been
under attack but has not yet been replaced); Winter, supra note 15, at 669-81 (using Kuhn's
theory to describe crisis and change in legal scholarship).
35 See supra note 34. Commentators have applied the term "paradigm" to the study of
professionalism, see, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New
Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in Lawyers' IdealslLawyers' Practices:
Transformations in the American Legal Profession 1, 2-3 (Robert L Nelson et al. eds.,
1992) (applying term "paradigm" to approaches to sociology of profession), but have not
applied Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts to the crisis of professionalism.
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and wrong, rather than true and false, the Professionalism Paradigm-
no less than a scientific paradigm-constrains the scope of legitimate
activity for its community.
Created in the late nineteenth century,36 when belief in the
Business-Profession dichotomy had eroded,37 the major problem the
Professionalism Paradigm sought to address was the preservation of
the distinction between a business and a profession. Its essence was a
bargain between the profession and society: The profession agreed to
use its skills for the good of its clients and the public. In exchange for
this promise, society ceded authority to the profession, including the
exclusive right to practice law and autonomy from government and, to
some extent, market regulation.38 The conditions of esoteric knowl-
edge, altruism, and autonomy-each of which distinguished a profes-
sion from a business-made this bargain both necessary and
possible. 39
36 See generally Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism 80-129 (1976)
(describing development of professionalism in late nineteenth century); Magali S. Larson,
The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis 104 (1977) ("Professions came of age
in America after the Civil War .... ); Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The
Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra
note 35, at 144, 150 (describing "last quarter of the nineteenth century [as] the 'take-off'
period of professionalization in the United States").
37 See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Prac-
tices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-
Civil War America 51, 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (noting widespread perception
that legal profession had become a business).
38 Some commentators have described the relationship between a profession and soci-
ety as the following type of contract:
"Perceiving a social need, and the profession's competence to handle it, the
society negotiates a deal with the profession: the society will confer the bene-
fits and privileges of a legal monopoly upon the group in return for a promise
of public service, i.e., a promise to carry on professional practice in accordance
with high standards of performance, for the public good."
Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 773,784 (quot-
ing Lisa H. Newton, Professionalization: The Intractable Plurality of Values, in Profits and
Professions 23, 34 (Wade L. Robison et al. eds., 1983)); see also Robert W. Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1988) (discussing corporate self-
regulation of lawyers); John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 Cornell
L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1982) (describing development of bar as means of regulating legal
system); Solomon, supra note 36, at 146-47 (explaining "autonomy" of legal profession).
39 Commentators do not agree on a single definition of professionalism. See Solomon,
supra note 36, at 145 (citing periodic "crises" in understanding of professionalism). How-
ever, these three conditions, perhaps under different labels and with different emphasis,
are common to most constructions of professionalism. See, e.g., Jay Katz, The Silent World
of Doctor and Patient 89 (1984) (discussing "dual criteria of esoteric knowledge and altru-
ism" and claim of "freedom from lay control"); Solomon, supra note 36, at 146-47 (describ.
ing knowledge and autonomy as "core sets of claims," but including this Article's element
of altruism as a subcategory of autonomy). Professional ideology generally falls within
progressive or functionalist traditions. Although these traditions are not identical, see, e.g.,
David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 717,
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The first condition, esoteric knowledge, made the bargain neces-
sary. Lawyers, like other professionals, have "mastered... esoteric
and inaccessible knowledge," as opposed to the more accessible
knowledge of business.40 The esoteric nature of the knowledge made
it very difficult for lay persons, including clients and the general pub-
lic, to evaluate the profession's work. 41 In contrast, all persons could
understand how businesses worked and what they produced, so that
government could regulate them and individuals could make knowl-
edgeable purchases on the market.42
While esoteric knowledge made the bargain necessary, lawyers'
altruism made the bargain acceptable. In contrast to businesspersons,
who maximized fiiancial self-interest, altruistic lawyers placed the in-
terests of the common good and of their clients above their own finan-
cial and other self-interests.43 Clients, who had no choice but to rely
724 (1988), they do agree on what this Article describes as the basic conditions of profes-
sionalism. See, e.g., id. at 723-25; William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of
the Professional Ideal, 37 Stan. L Rev. 565, 565-71 (1985) (analyzing empirical critique of
both functionalist and progressive theories of legal professionalism).
40 Solomon, supra note 36, at 146; see also Bledstein, supra note 36, at 90 (citing eso-
teric knowledge as justifying professional status); Moore, supra note 38, at 780 (tracing
historical use of term "profession"). For a discussion of economic theory supporting the
view that absent professional regulation professionals' esoteric knowledge would result in
market imperfections, see Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary
Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 545-46 (1994).
41 See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism 18 [hereinafter Commission Re-
port] (stating that a profession "requires substantial intellectual training and the use of
complex judgments... [t]hat clients... cannot adequately evaluate"); Katz, supra note 39,
at 89 (noting that "professional knowledge can only be professed, understood, and applied
by the initiated").
42 See, e.g., Bledstein, supra note 36, at 89-92 (contrasting regulation of business with
autonomy of profession); see also Commission Report, supra note 41, at 17-18 (distinguish-
ing profession from other occupations).
43 See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, Business-A Profession, in Business-A Profession 1, 2
(1914) (stating that the profession "is pursued largely for others and not merely for one's
self"); Commission Report, supra note 41, at 18 (observing that "the practitioner's self-
interest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest and the public
good"); Solomon, supra note 36, at 147 (noting that "the interests of the client and the
public are to take precedence over the lawyer's economic self-interest").
Some commentators have preferred the term "disinterestedness" to altruism. Talcott
Parsons, for example, argued that professionals were self-interested, as opposed to altruis-
tic. Their self-interest, however, was in the rewards of serving clients and the public, not
financial success. See Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in Essays in
Sociological Theory 34,35-36 (1954) (questioning sharp distinctions between altruism and
self-interest); see also Eliot Friedson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in Lawyers'
Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 35, at 215, 221 (noting importance of "symbolic re-
wards"). Under this definition, the conduct resulting from disinterestedness is the same as
altruism.
I prefer the term "altruism" because it suggests obligation to others, while "disinter-
estedness" suggests neutrality. Compare The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
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on the profession, could trust that professionals would not use esoteric
knowledge to exploit them.44 Similarly, society could trust that pro-
fessionals would exercise independent judgment and would not use
esoteric knowledge to advance their clients' interests at the expense of
society.4 5
The conditions of esoteric knowledge and altruism were interde-
pendent with the third condition of autonomy. As noted above, eso-
teric knowledge made it impossible for the nonlawyer public to
regulate lawyers' conduct through the government or the market.4 6
The profession ensured altruism by policing its members "through li-
censing, codes of ethics, and specialized 'disciplinary bodies. '47 Ac-
cordingly, in contrast to a business, which was subject to government
regulation and market control, the profession obtained the authority
to regulate itself.4s
Language 99 (1987) (defining altruism as "concern for the welfare of others") with id. at
405 (defining disinterested as "impartial"). See, e.g., Katz, supra note 39, at 89 (using the
term "altruism").
44 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 41, at 18 (stating that clients "must trust
those they consult"); Katz, supra note 39, at 89 (1984) ("The possession of esoteric knowl-
edge required professional authority, and altruism protected patients from any abuse of
such authority.").
45 See, e.g., ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 32 (1908) [hereinafter 1908
Canons] ("No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or
political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any ser-
vice or advice involving disloyalty to the law."); Gordon, supra note 38, at 14-17 (tracing
history of idea that lawyers exercise judgment independent of client to serve public);
Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in Parsons, supra note 43, at
370, 384 (noting that "the lawyer stands as a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires
of his clients and the social interest").
46 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
47 Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modem Legal Eth-
ics Code, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 35, at 95, 99; see also Commis-
sion Report, supra note 41, at 10 (describing a profession as "self-regulating-that is,
organized in such a way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are compe-
tent, do not violate their client's trust, and transcend their own self-interest"); Gordon,
supra note 38, at 16 (describing development of self-policing schemes ranging from the
formation of bar associations to the development of the Canons of Ethics).
48 Commission Report, supra note 41, at 18 (asserting that conditions of professional-
ism justify the profession's "special privileges, such as exclusive licensing"); Gordon, supra
note 38, at 6-7 (describing "freedom from outside regulation"); Solomon, supra note 36, at
147 ("[Tlhe bar, as a collective, is to be free of both governmental regulation and the full
effects of market forces.").
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]I
LAWYERS' BusmEss CoNDucr As A PROBLEM
FOR NORMAL DISCOURSE
In "normal discourse," Richard Rorty's phrase for describing the
equivalent of "normal science" in nonscientific communities,49 a para-
digm provides a framework for treating problems as puzzles to be
solved.50 The major puzzle for the Professionalism Paradigm was pre-
serving the Business-Profession dichotomy when most lawyers earned
their living by selling their services on the market.5 1
As noted above, the Professionalism Paradigm emerged in the
late nineteenth century in response to "the extraordinary outpouring
of rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal-bar association
and law school commencement addresses, memorial speeches on col-
leagues, articles and books-on the theme of the profession's 'decline
from a profession to a business." 5 2 The established paradigm of that
time, a "Republican Paradigm" based on the belief that individual
professionals who were above the self-interest of the market served as
guardians of the public good,5 3 appeared powerless to prevent this
decline.54
49 Rorty, supra note 16, at 11. For a discussion of normal science, see supra notes 16-19
and accompanying text.
50 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 79 ("[N]o paradigm that provides a basis for scientific research
ever completely resolves all its problems.").
51 The "vast majority" of laiwyers have engaged in private practice, as opposed to gov-
ernment service or public interest practice. Richard L Abel, American Lawyers 166
(1989).
52 Gordon, supra note 37, at 61.
53 In Federalist No. 35, relying on the dichotomy between business and professional
perspectives, Alexander Hamilton explained why professionals would make better political
leaders than those in business. He observed that mechanics and manufacturers will seek to
promote their economic self-interest. The "learned professions," on the other hand, "truly
form no distinct interest in society." The Federalist No. 35, at 48 (Alexander Hamilton)
(John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989). The professional "will feel a neutrality to
the rivaIships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial
arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to
the general interests of the society." Id. at 49. As Gordon S. Wood has noted, Federalist
No. 35 "reinforced a notion that has carried into our own time-that lawyers and other
professionals are somehow free of the marketplace, are less selfish and interested and
therefore better equipped for political leadership and disinterested decision-making than
merchants and businessmen." Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolu-
tion 254 (1992).
For an explanation of how this understanding formed the basis for the legal ethics
codes, see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992); see also James M. Altman, Modem Litigators
and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 Yale L.J. 1031, 1048-55 (1994) (reviewing Kronman, supra note
3, and discussing related conception of republican lawyering); Gordon, supra note 38, at
14-15 (discussing republican conception of lawyer's role).
54 See Altman, supra note 53, at 1056 ("By the turn of the century, the republican ideal
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The perception that the Professionalism Paradigm would succeed
where the Republican Paradigm had failed led the legal community
to adopt it.55 The Professionalism Paradigm rescued the Business-
Profession dichotomy 56 and a belief in the altruistic commitment of
lawyers by promising that the legal community would prevent trans-
gressions of the dichotomy and asserting that only the legal
community was qualified for this task.5 7
To implement the Professionalism Paradigm, the legal community
proscribed business conduct as taboo.58 This Article identifies the
Profit Maximizer taboo-of which the Business Servant taboo is a
special variation-as the primary business conduct taboo.
The Profit Maximizer behaves as if legal services are a commod-
ity like any other. While the professional obtains business by provid-
ing excellent and ethical services,5 9 the Profit Maximizer seeks as
much money as possible from the client60 and disregards obligations
of the lawyer-statesman existed mostly in lawyers' memories."); Gordon, supra note 37, at
62 (noting how "[r]ight after the Civil War, [lawyers] hope[d] to reconstitute the profes-
sions' [sic] virtue ... [b]ut that conception of the ideal had worn thin").
55 The adoption of the Professionalism Paradigm represented a consensus of bar associ-
ation leaders and other elite lawyers, not of the entire bar (including those from modest
backgrounds who represented immigrants, workers, and other persons of limited means).
See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change In Modem
America 40-73 (1976) (describing how elite dictated norms of stratified profession); Julius
H. Cohen, The Law-Business or Profession? 244 (rev. ed. 1924) (discussing lawyer who
argued that legal community should "admit [that] the commercialism of the profession"
was necessary to persons of modest means "who must derive their livelihood from the
practice of the profession"); Nelson & Trubek, supra note 35, at 13 ("In an earlier era the
elite of the profession may have controlled bar associations to such a degree that they
could present their conception of professional ethics as that of the entire profession ....").
56 The dichotomy afforded professionals both "a source of prestige," Gordon, supra
note 38, at 16, and a source of authority for persuading the state to enforce their privileges
and autonomy. See Larson, supra note 36, at 14 (noting that professional entrepreneurs
were "bound to solicit state protection and state-enforced penalties against unlicensed
competitors").
57 See supra Part I.B.
58 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists:
An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 313, 319 (1985) (using term "taboo" to describe legal profession's attitude
toward lawyers engaging in business behavior); Glendon, supra note 3, at 32 (same).
David Thomas observes that "[t]aboos operate on two levels. They forbid action, but they
also forbid reflecting on what is forbidden. As an injunction not to notice what is forbid-
den, a taboo operates out of awareness. That is why people find it difficult to discuss a
taboo." David A. Thomas, Mentoring and Irrationality: The Role of Racial Taboos, 28
Human Resources Mgmt. 279, 281 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
59 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 41, at 51 ("Activities directed primarily to
the pursuit of wealth will ultimately prove both self-destructive and destructive of the
fabric of trust between clients and lawyers generally."); Luban, supra note 39, at 723 (not-
ing that "purely economic motivation [is] ... pernicious"); Solomon, supra note 36, at 147
(asserting that "lawyers are to reject the business ethic of profit maximization"); Peter M.
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to the public.61 The Profit Maximizer openly markets legal services
and competes with other lawyers.62 Marketing is one of the Profit
Maximizer's most pernicious activities. The competition it engenders
leads lawyers to cut ethical corners in search of a buck.63 Perhaps
more dangerous to perception of law as profession, advertising and
solicitation constitute a public manifestation of legal services as a busi-
ness commodity.64
A special case of the Profit Maximizer is the Business Servant,
who maximizes profits by serving clients to the detriment of the pro-
fession's public trust.65 While a professional "holds a position of inde-
pendence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the
excess of either,"' s the Business Servant, in contrast, seeks "to extract
the maximum advantage of the legal system" for the interests of
wealth.67 In so doing, the Business Servant "skew[s legal outcomes] in
Brown, America's Legal Profession Is in Trouble. What Are We Going To Do About It?,
N.Y.S. BJ., May 1990, at 17 (asserting that where "making of money is the prime, if not the
sole, object in law practice... essential elements of trust and confidence between client
and attorney evaporate, leaving a residue of pursuit of money for money's sake").
61 See, e.g., Peter M. Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Profession:
Remarks Before the Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Association. 14
Fordham Urb. LJ. 855, 864 n24 (1986) (stating that profit-maximizing conduct threatens
"lawyer's monopolistic license to practice [law]" which rests on the bar's "traditional com-
mitment to public service"); see also infra notes 65-69, 145-46.
62 Professionals, in contrast, do not "hawk their wares" or compete aggressively for a
greater slice of the pie. Robert D. Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening Pandora's Box?, 19
Stetson L. Rev. 43,51 (1989); see also Brown, supra note 61, at 863 ("[U]nseemly competi-
tion 'for business' bring[s] rising aggressiveness and incivility."); Warren E. Burger, The
State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 63 (noting that, historically, "honorable law-
yers" did not advertise or solicit business).-
63 See, e.g., Wiliam H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 Ind. I.J. 151, 154
(1987) ("Ethical considerations, after all, are factors which counsel against maximization of
income in the best Adam Smith tradition, and the stronger the pressure to maximize in-
come the more difficult it is to avoid ethical margins.").
64 See Michael J. Powell, From Patrician to Professional Elite: The Transformation of
the New York City Bar Association 156 (1988) (asserting that advertising "manifest[s] a
spirit of commercialism").
65 Henry Stimson captured this notion when he wrote that:
I came to feel that the American lawyer should regard himself as a potential
officer of his government and a defender of its laws and constitution. I felt that
if the time should ever come when this tradition had faded out and the mem-
bers of the bar had become merely the servants of business, the future of our
liberties would be gloomy indeed.
Henry L. Stimson, Introduction to Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Ser-
vice in Peace and War at xi, xxii (1947) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone similarly disparaged "obsequious servant[s] of business." Harlan F. Stone, The Pub-
lic Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1934).
66 Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in Business-A Profession, supra
note 43, at 313, 321.
67 Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy. Social Values and
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 503 (1985). In contrast
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favor of resourceful parties, thus undermining the legitimacy of legal
institutions."' 8 The Business Servant fails the professional duty to
serve as a "'buffer between the illegitimate desires of clients and the
social interest."' 69
When breaches of these taboos occurred, the initial response was
to treat them as problems to be solved within the Professionalism Par-
adigm. Faced with open marketing of legal services-the "'buying
and selling of law business' "70-the American Bar Association
(ABA) declared such profit-maximizing conduct "unprofessional" and
sought to prevent it. Towards that end, in 1897, the ABA Committee
on Legal Education asked that law schools and practitioners "'incul-
cat[e] proper sentiments and... counteract[ ] the evil effects of the
introduction of modem business methods.' '' 71 The ABA then
adopted Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908 prohibiting advertising
and solicitation. 72
The response to violations of the Business Servant taboo was sim-
ilar. In 1905, for example, Louis Brandeis attributed a decline in the
profession's reputation to Business Servant conduct. He described
how "lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to
use their powers for the protection of the people. ' 73 His response was
not to discard the Professionalism Paradigm, but rather to exhort law-
yers to adhere to it.74
to professionals who use their "specialized knowledge to protect ignorant clients from ex-
ploitation .... [Business Servants use] their specialized knowledge to enable the rich and
powerful to exploit the poor and ignorant while enriching themselves in the process."
Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 741, 744
(1988).
68 Nelson, supra note 67, at 508.
69 Erwin Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man? 342 (2d ed.
1969) (quoting Parsons, supra note 45, at 384); see also Brandeis, supra note 66, at 317
(describing such lawyers as mercenaries).
70 Cohen, supra note 55, at 238, 173-200. Cohen describes, inter alia, a firm specializing
in railroad litigation with branch offices in 32 cities, "45 salaried railroad employees as
solicitors, [and] a hospital and medical staff for the purpose of providing medical treatment
for non-resident injured persons while they are awaiting trial." Id. at 183.
71 Id. at 149.
7 1908 Canons, supra note 45, Canons 27, 28; see Cohen, supra note 55, at 237-38
(citing 1897 ABA Report).
73 Brandeis, supra note 66, at 321.
74 Id. Similarly, in 1934, Harlan Fiske Stone suggested that lawyers' actions as Profit
Maximizers and Business Servants were in part responsible for the excesses that caused the
economic depression of the 1930s. Stone, supra note 65, at 1, 8-10. He called on the pro-
fession to return to its role as "guardian of public interests" and to consider "the way in
which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a whole." Id. at 10; see also
Solomon, supra note 36, at 152-53 (providing examples "of the denunciation[ ] of the com-
mercialization of practice").
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• At the same time that the Professionalism Paradigm proscribed
business conduct, it explained why even great financial success was
legitimate. Lawyers and the market for legal services functioned dif-
ferently from their business analogues. Financial self-interest was
only "incidental" 75 to lawyers who sought the rewards of achievement
and service 76 But in the market for legal services, the pursuit of
achievement and service was the source of financial success. The in-
visible hand of reputation, and not of economic efficiency, drove the
legal services market. 7 Under this model, the lawyers who made the
most money were those who were the most professional.
Another function of normal discourse was to marginalize per-
spectives outside of the Professionalism Paradigm. 78 For example, in
1933, Karl Llewellyn, one of the leading, though sometimes iconoclas-
tic, voices of twentieth-century legal scholarship,79 challenged the
Business-Profession dichotomy. He asserted that with rare
"[i]ndividual exceptions," lawyers who "work[] for business men to-
ward business ends" develop "a business point of view-toward the
work to be done, toward the value of the work to the community,
indeed, toward the way in which to do the work."'s
As an iconoclast, Llewellyn brought to his analysis of the profes-
sion what Kuhn described as an outsider perspective open to new
75 Harvard Law School's former dean Roscoe Pound described the "primary purpose"
of a profession as the "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service." Roscoe
Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times 5 (1953). He noted that "[g]aining a
livelihood is incidental [to a profession], whereas in a business or trade it is the entire
purpose." Id.
76 See Parsons, supra note 43, at 35-36.
77 The 1908 Canons of Ethics advised that "[t]he most worthy and effective advertise-
ment possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct." 1908 Canons,
supra note 45, Canon 27. The invisible hand of reputation was not an innovation of the
Professionalism Paradigm. Rather, it was a Republican Paradigm notion that the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm rehabilitated by introducing the concept of an organized and self-
policing legal community. In 1854, George Sharswood observed that "[s]ooner or later, the
real public-the business men of the community, who have important lawsuits, and are
valuable clients-endorse the estimate of a man entertained by his associates of the Bar,
unless indeed there be some glaring defect of popular qualities." George Sharswood, An
Essay on Professional Ethics, reprinted in 32 A.B.A. Rep. 1, 75 (5th ed. 1907); see Pearce,
supra note 53, at 260 (noting that Sharswood's model assumed that lawyers were experts to
whom consumers would defer in evaluating legal services).
78 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79 See Kronman, supra note 3, at 210 (characterizing Llewellyn as a "supremely tal-
ented but isolated thinker who had no followers in the conventional sense").
80 Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results, 167 Annals 177, 177
(1933). Llewellyn argued that "any man's interests, any man's outlook, are shaped in
greatest part by what he does .... His sympathies and ethical judgments are determined
essentially by the things and the people he works on and for and with." Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ideas challenging the Business-Profession dichotomy.81 In normal dis-
course, outsider perspectives have little influence.82 For example,
Rayman Solomon, in his comprehensive study of the "concept of legal
professionalism" from 1925 to 1960, observed how the Professionalism
Paradigm remained consistent throughout this period.8 3 He discusses
the influence of Llewellyn's support for legal services for low and mid-
dle income persons, but does not even mention Llewellyn's rejection
of the Business-Profession dichotomy.84
III
AN ANOMALY PROVOKES A CRISIS:
THE ATTACK ON THE BUSINESS-PROFESSION DIC1IOTOMY
Today, the Professionalism Paradigm's strategies for preserving
the Business-Profession dichotomy are no longer effective. As the
tension between lawyers' business conduct and the Business-
Profession dichotomy changed from a puzzle within the framework of
the Professionalism Paradigm to an anomaly challenging the para-
digm's competence, the legal profession entered a period of crisis.
A. The Puzzle Becomes an Anomaly
The difference between the status of a problem and an anomaly is
one of perception. Kuhn observed that a "problem normal science
sees as a puzzle can be seen from another viewpoint as a[n anomaly]
and thus a source of crisis." 85 The determinant of whether a problem
is a puzzle or anomaly is whether the community perceives it as possi-
ble of resolution within the paradigm. The precise moment when the
distinction between business and profession shifted from puzzle to
anomaly is difficult to identify. What is not difficult to identify is that
the change has occurred. This Section describes how the view that law
is a business entered the mainstream of community discourse and how
the perception of epidemic taboo conduct even caused defenders of
the paradigm to fear for its survival.
81 See supra note 31.
82 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
83 See Solomon, supra note 36, at 151 ("A continuity in the contents of the concept of
professionalism across the entire period emerges from these articles.").
84 Id. at 159, 167.
85 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 79. For a discussion of normal science, see supra notes 16-19
and accompanying text.
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1. The Challenge to the Dichotomy Becomes Mainstream
As noted above, in normal discourse 86 the legal community
treated opposition to the Business-Profession dichotomy as marginal.
The Supreme Court, for example, endorsed the dichotomy on a
number of occasions. In 1935, rejecting a due process challenge to a
ban on dental advertising, Chief Justice Hughes described professional
standards as "different... from those which are traditional in the
competition of the marketplace."8 7 The Court reiterated this view in
195588 and 1963.89
A few years later, however, the discourse within the legal com-
munity began to change as three lines of attack on the Professionalism
Paradigm emerged. One described the business-related ethics rules,
such as the advertising ban, as a hypocritical exercise in constraining
the business conduct of small and solo practitioners while permitting
the business practices of big firms, such as the use of social networks
to recruit wealthy clients.90 A historian of the legal profession attri-
buted this hypocrisy to early-twentieth-century efforts of a largely
Anglo-Saxon elite to restrict Catholic and Jewish immigrants from be-
coming lawyers.91
The second line of attack, not necessarily inconsistent with the
first, described the business-related ethics rules as promoting the
interests of the profession at the expense of the consumerY Ralph
Nader, Mark Green, and others in the consumer movement pressed
86 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
87 Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935).
88 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,491 (1955) (upholding regula-
tion preventing retail establishments from providing space to optometrists in "an attempt
to free the profession ... from all taints of commercialism").
89 Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424,428-29 (1963) (upholding New
Mexico statute that purported to protect high standards of professional competence by
proscribing certain forms of advertising by optometrists).
90 See Schneyer, supra note 47, at 100-01; see also Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics:
A Survey of the New York City Bar 66-71 (1966) (arguing that lawyers with "low-status"
clientele are more likely to violate Canons of Ethics than lawyers serving large, wealthy
corporations and well-to-do individual clients from old American families); Phillip
Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral Code,
37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 244,254-66 (1968) (discussing discriminatory effect of legal profes-
sion's Canons of Ethics and arguing that "the most cogent factors in the various Ethics
Committee opinions have little to do with right and good and much to do with the status
quo in regard to clients and the distribution of wealth resulting from service to clients").
91 See Auerbach, supra note 55, at 50. For a later expression of this view, see Monroe
H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 3 (1990) ("Just as labor unions of the time
joined in demanding restrictive immigration laws to restrain competition for jobs, the es-
tablished bar adopted educational requirements, standards of admission, and 'Canons of
Ethics' designed to maintain a predominantly native born, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
monopoly of the legal profession.").
92 See Schneyer, supra note 47, at 101.
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the case that the legal profession was obstructing competition to main-
tain the price of legal services at an artificially high level. 93 Leading
legal scholars, including Monroe Freedman and Thomas Morgan,
agreed that the rhetoric of the Business-Profession dichotomy masked
lawyers' financial self-interest. 94
A third line of attack, which did not expressly consider the busi-
ness conduct of lawyers, went the furthest in attacking the paradigm.
William Simon, for example, in his critique of "the ideology of advo-
cacy," proposed abolishing lawyers' monopoly on legal practice.95
By 1977, the voice of the United States Supreme Court confirmed
that doubts regarding the legitimacy of the Business-Profession di-
chotomy had become part of the mainstream of the legal community's
discourse. After questioning the Business-Profession dichotomy ear-
lier in the 1970s, 96 the Court rejected it altogether in Bates v. State Bar
93 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 64, at 156-57; Mark Green, The Gross Legal Product:
"How Much Justice Can You Afford?," in Verdicts on Lawyers 63 (Ralph Nader & Mark
Green eds., 1976).
94 See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 114-15(1975); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 702 (1977).
95 William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 13040. Simon
later sought to preserve the Professionalism Paradigm. See also Robert W. Gordon &
William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Prac-
tices, supra note 35, at 230 (providing further analysis of ideal of professionalism and spec-
ulating about conditions on which its redemption might depend).
96 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court struck down a
county bar's minimum fee schedule as illegal price-fixing under the Sherman Act. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, rejected the bar's argument that as a profession it
should be exempt from antitrust regulation. Id. at 787. The Court observed that the "ex-
change of [a legal service] for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that
word." Id. at 787-88. The Court, however, employed the normal discourse approach of
declaring the commercial aspect of practice to be incidental. It noted that "[ilt is no dispar-
agement of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business
aspect," id. at 788, and recognized that the "public service aspect, and other features of the
professions" made it "unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities." Id. at 788 n.17.
The Court took a similar tentative step in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), when it struck down a state ban on adver-
tising prescription drug prices. The Court found such advertising to be constitutionally
protected commercial. speech. Id. at 770. It rejected arguments that the ban was necessary
to prevent competition among professionals which would benefit the unscrupulous and
harm the unsophisticated consumer., Id. at 766-70. The Court again avoided directly con-
fronting the Professionalism Paradigm. It noted that "[t]he advertising ban does not di-
rectly affect professional standards one way or the other." Id. at 769. It further reserved
consideration of regulation of lawyer advertising because "lawyers, for example, do not
dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety
and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they
were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." Id. at 773 n.25.
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of Arizona97 when it overturned bans on lawyer advertising.98
*The Court's analysis squarely rejected the Business-Profession di-
chotomy.99 It declared that "the belief that lawyers are somehow
'above' trade has become an anachronism"'' x0 and described the or-
ganized bar's continued reliance on the dichotomy as hypocritical.10'
The Court treated the market for legal services like the market for
other business products and services, not as a special professional
market subject to the invisible hand of reputation. 02 Contrary to the
Professionalism Paradigm, consumers in a more open market would
be able to make informed decisions regarding the purchase of legal
services.103 As a result, the greater competition engendered by adver-
tising would probably lower prices and benefit individual clients and
society as a whole by making legal services more available to persons
of low and moderate income.104
The Court's opinion demonstrated that rejection of the Business-
Profession dichotomy had become a respectable position in main-
stream legal discourse. Since Bates, commentators have continued to
assert that financial reward is a significant goal of lawyers. 0 5 The
97 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
98 The case arose when two former legal aid lawyers in Arizona, seeking to create a
high volume practice providing services to persons of modest means, advertised a variety
of "'legal services at very reasonable fees."' Id. at 354. Arizona, like all other jurisdictions
at the time, banned lawyer advertising. Id. at 355. Accordingly, the Arizona Supreme
Court censured the lawyers for violating the state disciplinary code, and they appealed. Id.
at 353-58.
99 The majority denied that in doing so it was undermining the Professionalism Para-
digm. See id. at 368 ("[W]e find the postulated connection between advertising and the
erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained."). In dissent, however, Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice (and former ABA President) Lewis Powell recognized the radical
implications of the Court's opinion. Id. at 386 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("I particularly agree with Mr. Justice Powell's statement that 'today's decision
will effect profound changes in the practice of law."' (quoting id. at 389 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part))).
100 Id. at 371-72. The Court observed that "[]n this day, we do not belittle the person
who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force of his mind." Id. at 371.
101 See id. at 368 (asserting that there is little value in attorneys "conceal[ing] from
themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the
bar").
102 See id. at 374 n.30 ("Although the system may have worked when the typical lawyer
practiced in a small, homogeneous community in which ascertaining reputational informa-
tion was easy for a consumer, commentators have seriously questioned its current
efficacy.").
103 See id. at 374-75 (chiding bar for underestimating public's ability to supplement in-
complete, but correct, information in advertisements).
104 See id. at 376-77.
105 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 51, at 164-65 (identifying income and status as measures of
professional success); Commission Report, supra note 41, at 15 (arguing that increased
competition among lawyers after Bates and other Supreme Court decisions renders collect-
ing fees a priority); Cramton, supra note 40, at 610 (referring to "the entrepreneurial spirit
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Court itself applied the reasoning of Bates to proscribe a number of
limitations on lawyer marketing in subsequent cases. 106 Although the
Court's recent decision in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. 107 may signal
a retreat from the Bates holding,108 even overturning Bates would not
change the role that the Bates decision has played in confirming that
the perspective of law as a business had moved from the margin to the
center of the legal community's discourse.
2. The Perception of Widespread Taboo Violations
By the 1990s, the law community's perception was that taboo
business behavior was commonplace. Ronald Gilson and Robert
Mnookin observed that "yesterday's taboo [commercial behavior] has
become today's fixation."'10 9 In terms of dollars, law practice was now
on par with America's major industries. In their effort to accumulate
of the American bar"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed To
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1093 (1985)
(arguing that delivery of legal services is subject to market forces); Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 629 (1985) (attributing strong
"patronage alliance" between lawyers and clients to economic and other pressures); Fred
C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1303, 1337 (1995) (discussing lawyers' economic incentive to puff).
106 See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of II1., 496 U.S. 91, 109-11
(1990) (permitting advertising of certification as specialist); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478-80 (1988) (overturning ban on targeted direct mailings); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641-49 (1985) (prohibiting ban on offering
legal information regarding nature of potential claims and on use of illustrations to catch
reader's attention); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 199-207 (1982) (prohibiting, inter alia, ban
on lawyer's advertising admission to practice before Supreme Court). And while the Court
upheld a ban on in-person solicitation for profit, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 466-67 (1978), it struck down a ban on such solicitation for pro bono efforts. In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978).
107 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
108 In the Florida Bar case, the Court upheld Florida rules "creat[ing] a brief 30-day
blackout period after an accident during which lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, sin-
gle out accident victims or their relatives in order to solicit their business." Id. at 2374.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor found that this restriction satisfied the commercial
speech test that other restrictions had failed. Id. at 2381. In holding that the Florida re-
strictions directly and materially advanced the government's interest in regulating profes-
sions, id. at 2377-78, the Court relied upon a Florida Bar study indicating that "the Florida
public views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on
privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession." Id. at 2377.
Although the Court's opinion could be read narrowly to apply to the particular regula-
tions at issue, Justice Kennedy in dissent described it as "a major retreat from the constitu-
tional guarantees for commercial speech in order to shield its own profession from public
criticism." Id. at 2386. The previous request of Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 487 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), that the Court reconsider its decision in Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), suggests that the Florida Bar decision may have been the first
step toward the overruling of Bates.
109 Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 58, at 319.
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those dollars, lawyers engaged in widespread violations of the Profit
Maximizer and Business Servant taboos. Even the ABA, the para-
digm's institutional guardian, joined individual lawyers and members
of the public in acknowledging the existence of taboo behavior that
threatened the Business-Profession dichotomy.
In 1985, Gilson and Mnookin observed that "[1]aw practice is a
big business in this country.""' 0 As of 1987, the legal services industry
"added over $60 billion to the gross national product." ' By that
time, law was "a larger industry than the steel or textile industry."u12
Befitting a big business, individual lawyers at the highly visible large
corporate firms received salaries appropriate to business executives.
In 1990, "partner earnings [at big firms] averag[ed] over $1 million
annually.""13 Starting associate salaries rose in prestigious New York
City firms from $10,000 in 1967 to $65,000 in the late 1980s114 and
$80,000 in the 1990s.11 5
By the 1990s, violations of the Profit-Maximizer taboo had led to
the "common perception among legal commentators ... that lawyers
[were] primarily motivated by self-interest and the desire to make
money." 16 In large law firms, the profits a lawyer generated by pro-
curing business or producing billable hours, and not professional ex-
110 Id. at 313 n.1.
111 Nelson & Trubek, supra note 35, at 8.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 10.
114 Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Transformation of the Big Law Firm, in Law-
yers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 35, at 31, 52-53.
115 See Update, N.Y. I., Nov. 7, 1994, at 1 (identifying $83,000 as going rate for first-
year associates since 1989).
116 Elizabeth A. Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal Profession: Edging Closer
to Death with Each Passing Hour, 20 Stetson L. Rev. 419,423 (1991); see also Edward D.
Re, The Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 St. John's L. Rev. 85, 94
(1994) ("[T]he practice of law has become a war for legal business."). Commentators have
attributed the increase in lawyers' overt business behavior to a number of factors. Robert
L. Nelson and David M. Trubek have noted that in "recent years... [tihe deregulation of
finance and business, the internationalization of economic exchange, the rise of litigation
among corporate actors, and the continued expansion of demand for legal services by the
middle class has unleashed the entrepreneurial inclinations of American lawyers." Nelson
& Trubek, supra note 35, at 13. Other significant factors include the trend among busi-
nesses to employ a number of firms that compete for their share of business rather than a
single firm, Galanter & Palay, supra note 114, at 48, and the open marketing of legal ser-
vices following Bates and its progeny. Carroll Seron, New Strategies for Getting Clients:
Urban and Suburban Lawyers' Views, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 399, 400 (1993). In this con-
text, "lawyer-entrepreneurs introduced a series of innovations of scope and breadth unpar-
alleled either in our own history or in comparative perspective." Nelson & Trubek, supra
note 35, at 13.
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cellence, determined that lawyer's rewards. 117 Fewer lawyers
appeared to engage in public service, 18 and those who did found that
it brought them little favor at their firms. 19 Some lawyers took ad-
vantage of this atmosphere to "generat[e] the highest possible fee,"
rather than provide the best possible service.' 20 This pursuit of fees
became "a major cause of procedural incivilities. 121 It also became
the catalyst for law firms to take on the forms of businesses. They
added managers, business plans, marketing directors, and financially
driven strategies to maximize efficiency in making profits. 1 22 The
press eulogized the death of law firms that were not able to adjust
from a "professional" to a "business" approach.12-
117 See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 114, at 49 ("'Eat what you kill' compensation
formulas emphasize rewards for productivity and business-getting over 'equal shares' or
seniority." (citations omitted)).
118 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 39, at 734-35 (noting "loss of faith in progressive profes-
sionalist vision" and decreasing interest of private bar in public interest work); see also
infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 451, 460 (1985) (describing disincentives in firms for individuals to act according to
"professional" standards).
120 Kovachevich & Waksler, supra note 116, at 419. Commentators have suggested that
the use of billable hours for fees "encourages production of any services for which parties
are willing and able to pay." Rhode, supra note 105, at 634. Some assert that:
For a law firm, unnecessary work means additional profits. Consequently, the
legal profession has increasingly adopted methods that seem designed to bring
about desired fees, rather than desired results: several lawyers are assigned to
a project that could easily be handled by one; conferences, depositions, and
other meetings are attended by groups of lawyers from the representative
firms; discovery tends to drag on for months; issues are researched prema-
turely and previously acquired research is not used at all; quick settlements are
discouraged.
Kovachevich & Waksler, supra note 116, at 426. Studies have documented "many in-
stances of self-interested deception," a large proportion of which is related to billing. Lisa
G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 675 (1990); see also William G. Ross,
The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1991) (arguing that time-
based billing creates serious abuses for profession and raises difficult ethical questions for
practice of law); Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignorance and Overbilling, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994,
at 62 (reporting on prevalence of fraud and overbilling in legal profession).
121 Rhode, supra note 105, at 635 (noting that "innumerable commentators" have ob-
served this phenomenon).
122 See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 114, at 48-49 ("Firms rationalize their opera-
tions ... [and] engage professional managers and consultants; their leaders worry about
billable hours, profit centers, and marketing strategies."). In 1980, no firm had a marketing
director. Id. at 49. As of 1989, more than 200 did. Id.
123 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Oldest Law Firm Is Courtly, Loyal and Defunct, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 2, 1994, at A33 ("But Lord, Day's passing is about more than financial stratagems. It
is also, members of the legal community say, confirmation that a somewhat romanticized
way of law-firm life is over, that the profession has become a business.").
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One business strategy many law firms used was marketing.124
This led to a perception that unlike professionals who earned their
financial success by developing an excellent reputation, lawyers were
now "hawk[ing] their wares."''1 Law firms of all types marketed their
services through advertising, direct mail, newsletters to clients and po-
tential clients, and seminars on areas of practice where they sought to
develop clients.1 6 Sometimes these efforts were quite undignified.l Z7
As law firms became more like businesses, lawyers became Busi-
ness Servants. Instead of mediating between the interests of business
and the public, lawyers promoted the interests of business,128 even in
their pro bono and law reform activities.129 Some lawyers have gone
124 In 1990, the number of law-firm marketers registered in the National Law Firm Mar-
keting Association was 386. By 1994, the Association's membership rose to 1114. Claudia
H. Deutsch, Corporate Lawyers, Too, Turn to the Hard Sell, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21. 1995, at
B20.
125 Peltz, supra note 62, at 51; see also, e.g., Burger, supra note 62, at 62-63 (noting sharp
decline in public confidence in legal profession); Re, supra note 116, at 98 ("[Mluch of the
perceived commercialism of the legal profession has been directly attributed to attorney
advertising."); John J. Yanas, The President's Message, N.Y. St. BJ., May 1990, at 3, 3
("[W]e now condone advertising and solicitation of clients, activities that were formerly
unethical and unprofessional.").
126 See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Advertising, Lawyer Advertising at the Crossroads: Pro-
fessional Policy Considerations 55-57 (1995) (describing marketing and advertising prac-
tices at large firms); Seron, supra note 116, at 403-04 (discussing how new marketing
strategies conflict with Business-Profession dichotomy); David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y.
Tunes, Nov. 16, 1990, at B6 (noting that "the science of selling legal services had evolved
from embossing pencils to four-color spreads, newsletters, brochures, seminars and inserts
in opera playbills"). A partner at a major New York firm observed, "[Il]aw firms don't like
to admit they have business generation programs.... but the fact is, there is not a law firm
today that does not do marketing.' Deutsch, supra note 124 (quoting Eugene R. Ander-
son, founding partner of Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky).
127 See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Hard Sell, Am. Law., June 1995, at 67, 67-68 (providing
examples of advertisements including one where lawyer stands in junkyard with wrecked
automobiles being dropped from crane and another where client states: "'John Riley got
me $175,000... even though the police report said I was totally at fault'").
128 See, e.g., Linowitz & Mayer, supra note 3, at 4 (asserting that lawyers refrain from
counselling against "antisocial" business behavior because it "would interfere with the
marketing program"); Robert W. Gordon, Introduction to Symposium on the Corporate
Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 271,274 (1985) (noting that lawyers representing large corpora-
tions "have neither the opportunity nor the desire to reshape their clients' business or
political goals and chiefly confine their role to that of technical execution"). In his survey
of lawyers at large Chicago firms, Robert Nelson found that 76% of respondents affirmed
the professional ideology "that it was appropriate to act as the conscience of a client," but
only 2.4% indicated that they might have done so. Nelson, supra note 67, at 532-33. Only
16% of the lawyers "ever refused an assignment or potential work" on the ground of pro-
fessional or personal values. Id. at 535. Nelson concluded that, rather than mediate be-
tween the common good and their clients, "in general, large-firm lawyers strive to
maximize the substantive interests of their clients within the boundaries of legal ethics."
Id. at 538.
129 Nelson found that "[t]he lawyers of elite firms may well take progressive stands on
certain issues within the profession, may lead efforts at legal rationalization, and may ex-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1253
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
beyond maximizing the goals within the bounds of the law by aiding,
or engaging in, unlawful conduct. 130 For example, in highly publicized
cases, a number of the nation's leading law firms paid tens of millions
of dollars to settle proceedings against them arising from the Savings
and Loan scandals of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 131
These violations of the taboos became the subject of unprece-
dented media attention. Following Bates,1 32 The American Lawyer
and the National Law Journal emerged to chronicle the business of
law, including compensation, marketing, and business strategy for law-
yers, as well as more general news regarding the development of legal
practice. 33 At the same time, perhaps because of the success of the
legal press, general interest publications began to pay greater atten-
tion to the entrepreneurial conduct of lawyers. In 1983, for example,
the New York Times observed that for corporate law firms "a new era
has dawned, one in which the practice of law has ceased to be a gen-
tlemanly profession and instead has become an extremely competitive
business."134
Faced with such overwhelming and well-publicized evidence of
taboo behavior, the organized bar has conceded that such taboo be-
havior imperils the Business-Profession dichotomy. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's now-famous 1984 report to the ABA on The State of Justice
forced the profession to confront the tensions erupting within the Pro-
hibit a liberal orientation on general political questions, but the direction of their law re-
form activities and their approach to the issues that arise in ordinary practice ultimately are
determined by the positions of their clients." Nelson, supra note 67, at 505.
130 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 105, at 628 n.129 (citing cases and surveys that "reveal a
striking incidence of overly zealous representation ranging from garden variety discovery
abuse to suppression of evidence and complicity in fraud or perjury"); Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 31
(describing lawyers' role in assisting fraud perpetrated by O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.).
131 See, e.g., Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990)
(Sporkin, J.) ("Where were [the lawyers] when these clearly improper transactions were
being consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from
the transactions?"); Steve France, Unhappy Pioneers: S & L Lawyers Discover a 'New
World' of Liability, 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 725, 726 (1994) ("At least twenty-two of the
largest 200 law firms in the country... have been sued for malpractice ... [and Il]aw firms
have already paid more than $400 million in settlements.").
132 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., John E. Morris, Back to the Future, Am. Law., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 5, 5
(describing history and development of The American Lawyer and its central themes of
"the increasingly businesslike nature of practicing law and the impact of that trend on
individuals"); Steven Brill, Lawyers and Us 1979-1989, Am. Law., Mar. 1989, at 5 (describ-
ing origins of The American Lawyer); Doreen Weisenhaus, NLJ Grows with the Profes-
sion, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 29, 1993, at S2 (discussing history and development of the National
Law Journal); see also Stephen Gillers, The New Old Idea of Professionalism, 47 Rec.
Ass'n B. City N.Y. 147, 153 (Mar. 1992) (noting origin and influence of legal press).
134 Tamar Lewin, A Gentlemanly Profession Enters a Tough New Era, N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1983, § 3, at 1.
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fessionalism Paradigm. 35 He complained that the "standards and tra-
ditions of the bar" that had "restrain[ed] members of the profession
from practices and customs common and acceptable in the rough-and-
tumble of the marketplace" were no longer achieving this goal.13 At
Burger's urging,137 ABA President John Shepherd created a Commis-
sion on Professionalism. 138
When the Commission issued its report in 1986, it found the
major problem facing the bar to be preservation of the Business-
Profession dichotomy. The Commission concluded that "a quarter-
century of rapid change" in law practice forced the bar to consider
whether "our profession [has] abandoned principle for profit, profes-
sionalism for commercialism."1 39 The Commission found that
135 See Burger, supra note 62, at 62.
136 Id. at 63. Burger himself strongly adhered to the paradigm. He noted that, in the
past, lawyers respected the taboos on business conduct. "Historically," Burger observed,
"honorable lawyers complied with traditions of the bar and refrained from doing all that
the laws or the Constitution allowed them to do. Specifically, they did not advertise, they
did not solicit.., they considered our profession as one dedicated to public service." Id.
By 1984, the profession had suffered "in the past 10 years... a sharp decline in public
confidence" so that in comparison to other professions lawyers ranked "'near the bottom
of the barrel."' Id. at 62-63. Burger attributed much of this decline to the profession's
failure to satisfy the Professionalism Paradigm's ideal of public service. Among his exam-
ples of this failure was the open marketing of legal services.
Burger noted thaf the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977), challenged the Business-Profession dichotomy. It "placed lawyers in
much the same posture, with respect to advertising, as all other occupations." Burger,
supra note 62, at 63. A small but visible segment of the bar took advantage of this oppor-
tunity to "us[e] the same modes of advertising as other commodities from mustard, cosmet-
ics and laxatives to used cars." Id. at 64. Burger asked whether "our profession's low
public standing derive[s], in part at least, from the insistence of some lawyers on exercising
their First Amendment rights to the utmost?" Id. at 63.
137 Burger suggested that the ABA "create a study group of representative leaders of
our profession to examine these [and other problems related to decline of the profession]
and report to the association." Id. at 66. These other problems included competence, law-
yer discipline, discovery abuse, and excess zeal. Id.
138 Chaired by former ABA President Justin Stanley, the Commission included Profes-
sor and former dean Thomas Morgan, a leading scholar in the field of legal ethics, and
Professor Eliot Friedson, a leading scholar of the sociology of the professions, as well as
other scholars, a medical doctor, judges, and practicing lawyers. Commission Report,
supra note 41, at vi. Shepherd charged the Commission to examine both the actual and
perceived "performance" of the bar including "advertising" and "so-called commercializa-
tion," as well as "competence" and duties to clients and courts. Id.
139 Id. at 1. The Commission described two sources of these changes. One was in-
creased competition. As a result of Supreme Court decisions prohibiting restrictions on
competition, "as a matter of law, lawyers must face tough new economic competition with
respect to almost everything they do." Id. at 10. In addition, economic pressure resulted
from high associate salaries in large firms, high overhead .... and corporate clients shifting
from "historical relationship[s]" to shopping for low cost services. Id. at 15-16. Another
source was "changing ways of thinking about lawyers' ethics." Id. at 11. Lawyers "tended
to look at nothing but the rules" and "to ignore exhortations to set their standards at a
higher level." Id. at 13.
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"[g]etting clients in the door and getting them to pay their bills has
become a preoccupation for some members of the bar. ' 140 It de-
scribed United States District Judge John F. Grady's assertion, that in
many big firms "the dollar is what the practice is all about," 141 as rep-
resentative of the views of many in the bar.
The Commission recognized that the problem of maintaining the
dichotomy had become an anomaly demanding the profession's im-
mediate attention. It observed that "[t]he temptation to put profits
first will always be great [and] the increase in competitive pressures on
lawyers may make the temptation greater now than at any period in
history."'1 42 It warned that "[a]ctivities directed primarily to the pur-
suit of wealth will ultimately prove both self-destructive and destruc-
tive of the fabric of trust between clients and lawyers generally. ' 143
In its acknowledgment of an anomaly, the Commission was not
alone. In addition to the numerous commentators cited above, a 1990
survey found that "[n]early two-thirds (65 percent) of the attorneys
[surveyed] complain[ed] that the legal field has become less of a pro-
fession and more of a business."' 14 A 1993 ABA-sponsored poll
found that 59% of the public considered lawyers "greedy,1' 45 and a
recent poll found that 56% of the public believed that "lawyers use
the system to protect the powerful and enrich themselves. '1 46
B. Crisis: "A Period of Pronounced Professional Insecurity"147
As Kuhn's theory predicts, the emergence of an anomaly pro-
voked a crisis.1 48 As the Professionalism Paradigm began to unravel,
the leaders of an apprehensive legal community feared for the profes-
sion's future. Consensus regarding the paradigm dissolved. The legal
community could no longer marginalize challenges to the legitimacy
140 Id. at 15. For example, "groups of lawyers within firms who see themselves as bring-
ing in a disproportionate share of firm revenues are breaking off and taking clients with
them." Id. at 16.
141 Id. at 14 n.*.
142 Id. at 89.
143 Id.
144 Margaret C. Fisk, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up, Nat'l LJ., May 28, 1990, at S2.
145 Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi-The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 63; see also Randall Sambom, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 22 (noting results from poll showing that most-cited reason for
negative view of lawyers was that "lawyers are too interested in money").
146 Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. News & World Rep.,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 51.
147 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 67-68.
148 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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of the Professionalism Paradigm. Commentators sought guidance in
philosophy.1
49
Marking the current crisis are the apocalyptic descriptions of the
fall of the legal profession.' 50 Chief Justice Burger and the ABA
Commission on Professionalism have not been alone in perceiving the
threat to the Professionalism Paradigm. Since the Commission's Re-
port,151 commentators have asserted that lawyers, their ethics, and
their professionalism are "lost,"15 "betrayed,"15 3 in "decline,"'u s in
"crisis,"' 5 5 facing "demise,"1 56 near "death,"'1 and in need of "re-
demption."' 58 A president of the Colorado Bar observed that the
legal profession is "on the way into a black hole of pure commercial-
ism from which there ,is no return."'' 9 The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Virginia lamented that "something is wrong, and I
think I know what it is. It is commercialism. Yes, Commercialism,
with a capital 'C,' and it has invaded the legal profession like a swarm
of locusts.'1 6
Another indicator of a paradigm in crisis is the collapse of the
consensus regarding-the paradigm's meaning.161 A dramatic example
149 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
150 While apocalyptic pronouncements dominate law reviews and practitioner literature,
such sentiment is not unanimous. See, e.g., Milton V. Freeman, The Profession of Law is
NOT on the Decline, 96 Dick. L. Rev. 149, 162-63 (1992) ("Is [it] correct that the size and
prosperity of big firms is bound to ruin our profession? ... I think not."); John H.
Pickering, My Personal Verdict, After 55 Years: The Profession's Better Than Ever, Expe-
rience, Summer 1995, at 22,23 ("I do not share the gloom and doom that there has been a
decline in professionalism."); Michael J. Rooney, Report on Professionalism: The ABA
Attempts Suicide, fl1. BJ., May 1987, at 480,480 ("I, for one, simply do not believe there
has been a decline in professionalism among lawyers.").
151 See Commission Report, supra note 41.
152 Kronman, supra note 3.
153 Linowitz & Mayer, supra note 3.
154 Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 Fordham L Rev. 949 (1995);
Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on the Profession, Is Professionalism
Declining?, 47 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 129 (Mar. 1992); Robert B. McKay, The Rise of the
Justice Industry and the Decline of Legal Ethics, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 829 (1990).
155 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.I. 1239, 1239 (1991)
("'Crisis' in Legal Ethics"); W. Frank Newton, Crisis in the Legal Profession, 21 Tex. Tech
L. Rev. 897 (1990).
156 George J. McMonagle, The Demise of Professionalism, N.Y.S. BJ., May 1990, at 19.
157 Kovachevich & Waksler, supra note 116, at 419.
158 Gordon & Simon, supra note 95.
159 Alex S. Keller, Professionalism: Where Has it Gone?, 14 Colo. Law. 1383, 1385
(1§85).
160 Harry L. Carrico, The New Professionalism, N.Y.S. B.J., Jan. 1990, at 11,12 (address
delivered to first class in Virginia State Bar's mandatory course on professionalism).
161 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. While, as noted above, the consensus
to date has reflected the opinions of bar leaders and not necessarily the entire profession,
see supra note 55, in the crisis the paradigm's loss of authority has diminished the authority
of the organized bar's leadership within the profession and weakened the organized bar's
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of this development 62 is the ABA's turbulent debate regarding the
propriety of "lawyers' ownership or operation of entities that provide
'non-legal services which are ancillary to the practice of law,"' 1 63 or
"ancillary businesses."'164 In 1991, the ABA Litigation Section pro-
posed a rule banning ancillary business services except "in connection
with the provision of legal services and those provided 'in house."' 165
The Section argued that permitting ancillary businesses would permit
law firms "'to become profit-oriented conglomerates like other busi-
nesses"' and would result in "'the ethics of the marketplace"' sup-
planting "'lawyers' traditional ethical obligations. ' " 66 An opposing
proposal of the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility sought not to ban ancillary businesses but to regulate
them to ensure that they did not compromise lawyers' ethical
obligations. 167
ability to prevent deviation from established perspectives on professionalism. See, e.g.,
Nelson & Trubek, supra note 35, at 13 ("In recent years it has become apparent that no
single group can lay uncontested claim to the leadership of the bar's collective institutions
and thereby impose a single set of professional ideals or values.").
162 The end of the consensus was evident as early as the bitter debates regarding the
adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The many close votes in the
ABA House of Delegates revealed the "heterogeneity of [the bar's] ethical views,"
Schneyer, supra note 47, at 140, and "little agreement on the meaning of important terms
or the paths to be taken." Nelson & Trubek, supra note 35, at 2 (arguing that lack of
agreement applies to discussion of "professionalism vs. commercialism").
163 Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary
Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1993) (quoting Henry J. Reske
& Don J. DeBenedictus, Ethics Proposal Draws Fire, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 34).
Although lawyers had traditionally offered clients nonlegal services such as "title insur-
ance, trust services, and patent consulting," Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7
cmt. (1991 version, repealed Aug. 1992), in the 1980s firms began to offer other services,
such as lobbying and investment consulting. Schneyer, supra, at 367-68. In 1986, the Com-
mission on Professionalism suggested that such ancillary businesses undermined the Busi-
ness-Profession dichotomy and asked the ABA "to initiate a study to see what, if any,
controls or prohibitions should be imposed." Commission Report, supra note 41, at 54-55.
The ABA initiated such a study which resulted in the ABA's consideration of two compet-
ing proposals in 1991. Schneyer, supra, at 369-71.
164 Schneyer, supra note 163, at 367.
165 Id. at 364.
166 Id. at 371-72 (quoting Letter from Judah Best et al., to members of the ABA House
of Delegates, July 19, 1991, at 3-4). The Section's leaders declared that "the resolution of
the ancillary business controversy goes to the heart of who we are as a profession and what
we will become." Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.7: Its
Origin and Interpretation, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739, 799-800 (1992) (quoting Best et al.,
supra, at 3). The vote would determine "'whether [the legal profession] wish[ed] to con-
tinue as a self-regulating profession committed to both its traditional (and unique) ethical
obligations and to public service, even at the cost of turning away some profits from non-
legal ventures."' Id. at 799 (quoting Best et al., supra, at 3-4).
167 Schneyer, supra note 163, at 371.
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In August 1991, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Litiga-
tion Section's proposed ban by a narrow 197-186 vote.168 In August
1992, the House reversed itself by an even narrower 190-183 vote and
repealed the ban. 169 In February 1994, by a close but wider margin of
237-183, the ABA adopted a rule similar to that offered by the Ethics
and Professional Responsibility Committee in 1991.170
The adoption of the 1994 rule represents another feature of the
paradigm in crisis, typifying the emergence of an alternative version of
the Professionalism Paradigm, which this Article will refer to as "Busi-
ness Professionalism." Business Professionalism either expressly de-
scribed law practice as both a business and profession or implicitly
adopted that view by seeking to regulate, and not prohibit, business
conduct. 171 Where "pure" professionalism is hostile to business con-
duct, such as advertising or ancillary business practices, 172 Business
Professionalism seeks to regulate these practices to protect clients and
to encourage lawyers to perform them in a "professional" manner.173
In the altruistic interest of serving the public, some varieties' 74 of
Business Professionalism may relax the conditions of expertise and
autonomy to permit nonlawyer practice of law 75 and public regula-
168 Id. at 364. Ted Schneyer credits the ban's victory on the proponents' ability to use
professionalism rhetoric to "mobilize" support. Id. at 365, 372.
169 Id. at 364 & n.10.
170 ABA Reformulates Ancillary Business Rule, Reaffirms Support for Universal
Health Care, 62 U.S.L.W. 2497 (1994); James Podgers, House of Delegates: Ancillary
Business Provision Added to Model Rules, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994, at 117.
171 Thomas Morgan's influential 1977 article, "The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility," anticipated the development of Business Professionalism, including a con-
cern with rules promoting the self-serving interests of the bar and an appreciation of how
competition and advertising, as well as nonlawyer practice, could benefit the public. See
Morgan, supra note 94, at 740-43. Other expressions of Business Professionalism include
the Supreme Court's opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and the
description of law as a business and a profession in Hazard et al., supra note 105, at 1112
(noting that "the practice of law manifestly is both a profession and a business").
172 See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 487 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (urging reconsideration of Bates); Burger, supra note 154, at 955-57 (asserting
that organized bar should implore lawyers not to advertise).
173 See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7 (1994) (regulating ancillary
business services); ABA Aspirational Goals on Lawyer Advertising (1988). reprinted in
Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 328-
29 (1995) ("When properly done, advertising can ... be a productive way for lawyers to
build and maintain their client bases.").
174 Advocates of Business Professionalism will sometimes take a Business Professional-
ism position on some issues and a pure Professionalism Paradigm position on others. For
example, the Commission on Professionalism followed Business Professionalism with re-
gard to advertising and nonlawyer practice, Commission Report, supra note 41, at 46-48
(advertising), 54 (nonlawyer practice), and pure professionalism with regard to ancillary
businesses. Id. at 53-55.
175 The leading advocate of nonlawyer practice has been Deborah Rhode. See Deborah
L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209,233
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tion of the bar.176
The crisis has also been marked by perspectives of legal commen-
tators dispensing entirely with the Business-Profession dichotomy.
Jerold Auerbach and Monroe Freedman assert that the taboos on
business behavior are illegitimate products of a bigoted bar elite.' 77
Thomas Shaffer ascribes a different type of hypocrisy to the dichot-
omy. He describes it as the view that lawyers who are "paid well...
from the profits of commercialism... act in a spirit of public service,"
but that "[t]hose who practice commercialism do not.' 78 Instead, he
proposes that all persons have an obligation to "serve the common
good" and that this obligation apply equally to business and to law
practice.' 79 Ted Schneyer, however, seeks the exclusion of profession-
alism from discussion of legal ethics on the ground that professional-
ism introduces irrational and sloppy thinking8so Meanwhile, although
Richard Posner denies that the transformation of the legal community
"over the past three decades ... in the direction of a competitive
enterprise" constitutes "deprofessionalization,"'1' he welcomes the
end of professional privilege as nonlawyers are increasingly able to
practice law. 8'
Outside the legal community, a variety of groups have attacked
the paradigm. The past few decades have seen the development of a
publishing industry providing books to help consumers avoid using
(1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Non-Lawyer Practice] (discussing role of nonlawyers in provid-
ing low-cost legal services); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 99 (1981) ("Absent evidence of significant injury from lay assistance, individuals
should be entitled to determine the cost and quality of legal services that best meet their
needs."); see also Commission Report, supra note 41, at 89-91 (advocating limited nonlaw-
yer practice); Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Professional Responsi-
bility, Prohibitions on Nonlawyer Practice: An Overview and Preliminary Assessment, 50
Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 190, 192 (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 N.Y. Bar Ass'n Report]
(same); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 269-73 (1988) (same).
176 See Abel, supra note 51, at 246-47 (arguing that "regulation of lawyer incompetence
and misconduct must be entrusted to an institution wholly independent of both the orga-
nized bar and private practitioners"); Rhode, supra note 105, at 641.42 (advocating imple-
mentation of independent regulatory body free from bar control); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Disciplinary Process Needs Major Reforming, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 13, 14 (describing
report that "implies that relocating enforcement jurisdiction from the bar to a public
agency would substantially improve the machinery's performance").
177 See supra note 91.
178 Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 Gonz. L. Rev.
393, 403 (1990-91).
179 Id. at 403-04.
180 See Schneyer, supra note 163, at 396 ("ABA leaders should take pains to consign the
idiom [of professionalism] to the museum of discredited policymaking tools.").
181 Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, in Posner, supra note 34, at
33, 64.
182 See id. at 79.
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lawyers and help themselves, 18 as well as a consumer movement
seeking to end professional privilege and autonomy altogether.1' 4
Still another attack rejects the paradigm's assumption that the legal
profession provides a public service. A number of economists have
described lawyers as self-interested "rent seekers" whose only func-
tion is to enrich themselves while unnecessarily expending re-
sources.'8s Others assert that lawyers promote legal complexity to
benefit their own financial interests.186 Borrowing from these per-
spectives, Vice President Dan Quayle complained in 1991 that the
large number of lawyers in the United States harmed the economy.187
183 At the forefront of this movement has been Nolo Press, a company dedicated to
producing do-it-yourself books, tapes, and software programs. Founded in 1971, Nolo
Press offers nearly 100 different legal titles, with sales totaling over S8 million in 1993. See
Claire Cooper, Power to the People, Sacramento Bee, Oct. 16, 1994. at G1 (describing
Nolo Press). John Wiley and Sons, Inc. in New York and Sphinx Publishing in Clearwater,
Florida also publish self-help legal books. Kathleen Pender, Publisher Finds Niche in Self-
Help Law Books, S.F. Chron., Apr. 12, 1993, at C1.
184 See, e.g., Help from HALT, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1988, at B5 ("HALT [Help Abolish
Legal Tyranny] makes help available in the form of eight Citizens Legal Manuals, which
guide nonlawyers through probate, divorce, small claims, and estate-planning
procedures.").
185 See, e.g., David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking:
First Estimates, 58 Pub. Choice 269, 271 (1988) (describing lawyers as "either active or
passive participants in the process of legallpolitical rent-seeking"); Stephen P. Magee. The
Irvisible Foot and the Waste of Nations: Lawyers as Negative Externalities, in Stephen P.
Magee et al., Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in
General Equilibrium (1989) (describing effect of legal activity on redistributing income);
Kevin M. Murphy et al., The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 QJ. Econ.
503, 505 (1991) (characterizing rent-seekers as those whose "private returns come from
redistribution of wealth from others and not from wealth creation"). But see Frank Cross,
The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the
Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 Tex. L Rev. 645,
649 (1992) ("[T]he measured negative effects of lawyerification on national welfare are
highly uncertain and incomplete."); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profes-
sion: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L Rev. 869; 916 (1990) ("The promise for resur-
recting important elements of professionalism lies in understanding the demand, not the
supply, side of the market for legal services.").
186 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78
Am. Econ. Rev. 311, 313 (1988) ("Neither plaintiff nor defendant lawyers want a set of
rules so complex that no lawsuit will be brought at all, just as they do not want a set of
rules so simple that their services could be dispensed with in settling cases... ."); Paul H.
Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. Legal Stud.
807, 808-09 (1994) (describing benefits to lawyers from amended tort law); Michelle J.
White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 Int'l Rev. L & Econ.
381, 393 (1992) (concluding that "lawyers prefer an intermediate level of legal complexity"
because of trade-off between higher fees and fewer cases brought when law becomes more
complex).
187 See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28
Ga. L. Rev. 633, 645-47 (1994) (noting role of Quayle's speech in promoting claim that the
United States has 70% of world's lawyers); Mark Hansen, Quayle Raps Lawyers: ABA
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Another characteristic of a paradigm crisis is a turn to first princi-
ples.188 Some commentators defend the Business-Profession dichot-
omy on the basis of its progressive roots189 or of a republican
perspective grounded in Aristotelian philosophy. 90 Numerous com-
mentators apply moral philosophy to problems arising from the ten-
sion between the Professionalism Paradigm's condition of altruistic
service to the public and lawyers' adversarial role.19' Other commen-
tators use moral philosophy,192 postmodeMism, 193 and religion 94 to
President's Response Spurs Complaints, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 36, 36 (quoting Quayle's
remarks regarding adverse impact of large numbers of lawyers on economy).
188 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38, at 11-13 (discussing claim that lawyers must remain
independent of all factional interests in society-including their clients-to apply their
skills to progressive public purposes); Gordon & Simon, supra note 95, at 234-35 (advanc-
ing public service ideal as reason for taking professionalism seriously); Luban, supra note
39, at 736-40 (urging incorporation of "progressive professionalism" into elite law firm
practice).
190 See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 3, at 34-52 (outlining Aristotelian-based ideal of law-
yer-statesman).
191 See generally, e.g., Luban, supra note 175 (arguing that lawyers should determine
professional ethics by questioning what profession and its institutions should be doing);
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Human Rights 1
(1975) (exploring moral implications of lawyer's professionalism as it relates to lawyer's
conduct towards client and world at large). For a critique of these approaches, see Ted
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. Rev.
1529 (arguing that financial, psychological, or organizational pressures, not professional
ethics, cause lawyers to favor client interests at expense of third parties).
192 See generally, e.g., Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism: The Deep Theory, 72
N.C. L. Rev. 1271 (1994) (arguing that professional and personal morality are inseparable
and that legal practice cannot and should not be viewed as mere instrumentalism); Peter
Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1139 (1995) (re-
viewing Milner S. Ball, The Word and the Law (1993), and Kronman, supra note 3); Simon,
supra note 95, at 130-44 (advancing "non-professional advocacy" model based on personal
ethics as alternative to professional advocacy model).
193 See generally, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering (1992) (using fictional
characters and legal institutions to outline and explore ethical and progressive legal prac-
tice); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. L.J. 2567 (1993) [hereinafter
Alfieri, Impoverished Practices] (offering postmodernist inquiry of formal and instrumen-
tal enactments of ethical judgment using close examination of single case study); Anthony
V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1233 (1992) (conducting postmodernist critique of
writings of Clark Cunningham, James Boyd White, and Naomi Cahn, and arguing that
modernist approach to lawyering results in mistranslation of clients' stories); Lucie E.
White, Seeking "... the Faces of Othemess ... ": A Response to Professors Sarat,
Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1499, 1511 (1992) (arguing that when dealing with
clients, lawyers should seek "not just negotiations of power.., but also to recognize in all
its alterity, the other's face").
194 See generally, e.g., Ball, supra note 192 (seeking to show how nonreligious theology
is relevant to law); Thomas Shaffer, On Being a Christian and a Lawyer: A Law for the
Innocent (1980) (examining moral dilemma posed to Christian lawyers by demands of sec-
ular laws and Judeo-Christian principles); Joseph Allegretti, Christ and the Code: The
Dilemma of the Christian Attorney, 34 Cath. Law. 131 (1991) (proposing Christian "ethic
of care" to guide lawyer conduct); Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Re-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1262 [Vol. 70:1229
December 1995] THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
construct frameworks for evaluating lawyer conduct independent of
the Professionalism Paradigm.
This turn to philosophy, together with expressions of professional
insecurity, diversification of approaches to professionalism, and grow-
ing opposition to the Professionalism Paradigm, are symptoms of the
legal community's current crisis of professionalism. Provoked by the
anomaly resulting from the intractability of the perception that law
practice is a business, the crisis has thus far proven impossible for the
legal profession to resolve.
IV
REVOLUTION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE Busn.ss PARADIGM
Kuhn's methodology has thus far helped identify the cause and
symptoms of the crisis of professionalism. The next step is to antici-
pate how the legal community's crisis will end. Kuhn's theory, though,
provides no ready formula for determining the outcome of a crisis. As
discussed above, a crisis can end with the anomaly resolved within the
existing paradigm or bracketed for future consideration, or the crisis
can form the basis for generating a new paradigm.195 This Part consid-
ers and rejects the first two alternatives as unlikely to resolve the legal
community's crisis. The anomaly is too fundamental to the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm, and the perception of law practice as a business is
too pervasive to permit these resolutions. With regard to the third,
reconceptualizing the current crisis as the breakdown of the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm reveals the possible emergence of a new paradigm
that would resolve the anomaly quite simply-law practice as a busi-
ness (Business Paradigm). This new paradigm may surpass the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm with respect to the goals of serving clients and
society.
A. Why Attempts To Revive the Professionalism Paradigm or
Bracket the Anomaly Will Probably Fail
Many commentators have sought to revive the Professionalism
Paradigm through exhortation, education programs, and greater polic-
ing of the bar.196 The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Florida Bar
flections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L Rev. 1577 (1993)
(examining impact of membership in legal profession on one's identity as a Jew); Russell
G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society. A Midrash on Levinson, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 1613 (1993) (commenting and expanding on Levinson).
195 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 41, at 20-25 (offering recommendations for
law schools, practicing lawyers, bar associations, and judges); Donna M. Bloemer, The
Salmon P. Chase American Inn of Court, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 255,255 (1994) (explaining how
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v. Went for It, Inc. 97 suggests that the Court may consider overruling
Bates1 98 and permit the bar to strengthen the Profit Maximizer taboo
by reimposing a ban on advertising. Business Professionalism at-
tempts to bracket the anomaly by declaring law both a business and a
profession. Other possible approaches would make the anomaly
irrelevant by using professionalism as a "conceit" 199 or a "'white
lie' ' '200 that sets a moral tone regardless of the validity of the
Business-Profession dichotomy.
To be effective, however, these strategies require a continued be-
lief in the Professionalism Paradigm. But the anomaly, in this case,
arises because many lawyers and members of the public believe that
law practice is a business, and because taboo violations are wide-
spread and ongoing.20' Accordingly, faith in the Professionalism Par-
adigm is almost impossible to sustain. Even overruling Bates202 would
probably have little effect. It is unclear whether states would reinstate
bans on advertising and even if they did, .whether perceptions would
change as a result. In Bates, the Court recognized the perception that
the Business-Profession dichotomy was an "anachronism" at a time
when lawyers had not yet been allowed to advertise.203
Advocates of bracketing the anomaly could argue that their ap-
proaches do not require belief in the dichotomy. They ask the legal
community only to put the anomaly aside. The anomaly, however, is
too fundamental to the existing paradigm to ignore. Without it, the
paradigm has no credibility. 2°4 In addition, the approach of Business
Professionalism is internally incoherent. Under the Professionalism
Paradigm, an occupation cannot be both a business and a
profession.205
In these circumstances, efforts to revive the Paradigm or bracket
the anomaly pose dangers to the bar and to the legal system. First,
the American Inns of Court Foundation, founded in 1985, seeks to "help trial and appellate
lawyers and judges rise to higher levels of excellence, professionalism, and ethical aware-
ness"); Burger, supra note 154, at 956-57 (urging renewed commitment to professionalism);
Gordon & Simon, supra note 95, at 257 (suggesting steps for redeeming legal profession);
Carrico, supra note 160, at 11-12 (explaining importance of required course on profession-
alism for Virginia lawyers).
197 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
198 See supra note 108.
199 See Schneyer, supra note 163, at 383.
200 Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Action, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183, 1262
(1982) (quoting Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions 5 (1967)).
201 See supra Part III.A.
202 See supra note 108.
203 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977).
204 See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
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differences regarding the dichotomy will continue to divide the legal
community into sometimes warring camps, as the ancillary business
debate demonstrated. 206 Second, if the public and the bar generally
disbelieve the dichotomy, lawyers who follow the paradigm appear to
be either hypocrites doing one thing while saying another, cynics
manipulating for their own purposes an ideology they reject, or naive
fools unaware of what everyone else knows. This situation invites dis-
respect not only for lawyers but for the entire the legal system.20
B. The New Paradigm: Law Practice As a Business
Kuhn suggests that it is difficult to anticipate specific contours of
a new paradigm that will succeed in replacing an old one. He does,
however, identify the basic characteristic of a successful new para-
digm: It resolves the anomaly.208 Without overtly adopting it, the
legal community has begun to employ a new paradigm that resolves
the anomaly: the Business Paradigm.
1. The New Paradigm Emerges
The Business Paradigm is evident in the way much of the legal
community perceives itself. Defenders and opponents of the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm agree that lawyers are behaving like businessper-
sons.20 9 They structure their practices and sell their services using the
same techniques as other businesspersons o10 Many, if not most, com-
mentators recognize that financial self-interest plays an important role
in lawyers' conduct.2 1'
The perception that law practice is a business also pervades dis-
cussions of professional responsibility. As discussed above, the ver-
sions of Business Professionalism, including the Bates opinion,2 12
ABA Commission on Professionalism Report,213 and views of numer-
2o See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
207 Indeed, widespread public cynicism regarding lawyers' self-interest might explain the
prevalence of negative and inconsistent views regarding the legal system. Compare
Budiansky et al., supra note 146, at 52 (noting that the public believes legal system favors
the rich) with Galanter, supra note 187, at 652-54 (observing that commentators argue that
legal system oppresses wealthy and businesses). It may also help explain why the image of
lawyers is declining. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 187, at 663 ("Over the past decade,
general estimations of lawyers have fallen."); Randall Sambom, Tracking Trends, Nat'I
L.., Aug. 9, 1993, at 20 (discussing polls iidicating decline in public view of lawyers).
208 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 153.
209 See supra notes 116-46, 152-87 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 105.
212 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
213 Commission Report, supra note 41.
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ous commentators,214 reject the Business-Profession dichotomy in
whole or in part and accept that law is a business. Still other commen-
tators reject the Professionalism Paradigm entirely and support
outside regulation215 and the end of professional privilege.216
As a corollary to treating law as a business, commentators reject
the Professionalism Paradigm's characterization of businesspersons as
morally inferior to lawyers. Thomas Shaffer, for example, finds an
ethic of service consistent with all occupations and derides the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm's characterization of lawyers as somehow superior
to others in money-making occupations.217 Mary Ann Glendon de-
cries "lawyers' disdain for commerce" and "cramped concepts of busi-
ness ethics. ' 218 Glendon's comments also reflect an understanding of
changes in business practice, which, with the development of graduate
training and a substantial concern for business ethics, has come to re-
semble more closely the practice of a profession.21 9
The reinterpretation of business as a worthy endeavor, together
with the acknowledgment that law practice has the characteristics of a
business, suggest a new understanding of the framework for the deliv-
ery of legal services. Whether that understanding will result in a para-
digm shift is not possible to predict with certainty. Some
commentators have already abandoned the Professionalism Para-
digm.220 Although others are not yet willing to go that far,221 trends
appear to favor the new paradigm. Newer members of the profession
appear more willing to view law practice as a business,2 2 the public
214 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
215 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 91, at 2 (criticizing idea that lawyer self-governance
is either necessary or beneficial).
216 See, e.g., supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
218 Glendon, supra note 3, at 70.
219 See, e.g., Norman E. Bowie, Business Ethics as a Discipline: The Search for Legiti-
macy, in Business Ethics: The State of the Art 17 (R. Edward Freeman ed., 1991) (arguing
that courses in business ethics are necessary component of business curriculum and that
business practice should be informed by both altruistic and self-interested ideals).
220 See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
221 For example, adherents of Business Professionalism cling, albeit inconsistently, to
the Professionalism Paradigm. See supra notes 36-48, 171-76 and accompanying text.
222 See Seron, supra note 116, at 412-14 (discussing differences in attitudes towards ap-
proaches to acquiring new business).
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continues to view law practice as a businessm and taboo violations
show no sign of abating3224
2. The Operation of the Business Paradigm
The emergence of the Business Paradigm invites consideration of
how it would operate and how it would compare with the Profession-
alism Paradigm. Although necessarily speculative, such consideration
suggests a range of potential arrangements under the Business Para-
digm, including a "Middle Range" proposal to implement the goals of
providing quality legal services and promoting the common good.
The anomaly arising from the Professionalism Paradigm's failure
to curtail the business conduct of lawyers disappears under the Busi-
ness Paradigm. If law is a business, the business conduct of lawyers is
expected, not problematic. Business conduct evolves from an anom-
aly under the old paradigm to a "tautology" under the new para-
digm.225 As the anomaly fades, the conditions of the Professionalism
Paradigm lose their vitality.
With regard to the-condition of esoteric knowledge,2 the new
paradigm recognizes that legal services resemble many other goods
and services in terms of consumers' ability to evaluate them. Many
consumers, including individuals who are repeat customers and busi-
nesses that employ in-house counsel, are quite sophisticated in their
ability to evaluate legal services and do not need special protec-
tions. 7 As for the less sophisticated who are unable to evaluate legal
services without assistance, their situation is comparable to consumers
of many other goods and services. Numerous consumers of goods and
223 See supra notes 123, 134, 145-46 and accompanying text. The United States Justice
Department recently accused the ABA of anticompetitive conduct in its regulation of legal
education, presumably the least business-like component of the legal profession. See Ken
Myers, Settlement Will Mean Changes in ABA's Accreditation Process, Nat'l LJ., July 10,
1995, at A15 (describing consent decree between government and ABA).
224 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 610 ("Competition in legal services markets is a
fact of life that will not go away."); see also supra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
225 Kuhn, supra note 4, at 78 (asserting that what were previously anomalies become
"very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been
otherwise").
226 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 114, at 48 (describing effect of in-house coun-
sel on market for legal services); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 97-101 (1974)
(describing repeat players as knowledgeable consumers of legal services); Robert E. Ro-
sen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Represen-
tation, 64 Ind. LJ. 479, 481-86 (1989) (discussing increased expertise and influence of in-
house counsel); Irving B. Levinson, Do You Really Need To Hire Outside Counsel? Read
This First; 101 Ways To Control Outside Legal Costs-Part I, Corp. Legal Tunes, Aug.
1995, at 11 (offering example of purchasing considerations in-house counsel use).
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services-such as automobile repair, computers, and household appli-
ances-lack the expertise to evaluate what they are purchasing.
With regard to the condition of altruism,22 8 the Business Para-
digm neither assumes superior character for lawyers nor disparages
the commitment of other businesspersons to the common good. The
Business Paradigm does not assert that lawyers automatically place
the interests of clients and society above their own. Like other busi-
nesspersons, lawyers place a significant emphasis on maximizing their
own financial and other self-interests. Yet, as Thomas Shaffer pro-
poses, the Business Paradigm recognizes that every individual and
every occupation possesses the capacity for moral character and
conduct.229
The Business Paradigm does not assume that lawyers are auto-
matically entitled to autonomy from the public and the market. Ab-
sent special expertise and altruism, the rationale for the legal
community's automatic autonomy fails233 0 Lawyers would be no more
entitled than other businesspersons to have an exclusive license to
provide services or to regulate their community free from the en-
croachment of public and market.
This analysis of how the Business Paradigm eliminates the ele-
ments of the Professionalism Paradigm also indicates how many issues
the Business Paradigm leaves open. Clearing away the Professional-
ism Paradigm's baggage is only the beginning of problem-solving ef-
forts under the Business Paradigm. The puzzles of how to provide
clients with high quality services and how best to promote the com-
mon good remain.
Under the Business Paradigm, the institutional arrangements for
solving these puzzles could either resemble, or radically depart from,
those of the Professionalism Paradigm.23 ' At one extreme, the public
and the legal community could recreate the institutions of the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm. The public could authorize the legal community
to regulate itself, and the legal community could adopt the same rules
and continue the same self-regulatory procedures it now employs.
What would be different is how these institutional arrangements
would be explained. In contrast to the entitlement under the Profes-
sionalism Paradigm, the basis for self-governance would be the actual
228 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
229 Shaffer, supra note 178, at 403-04.
230 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
231 This Article does not consider one additional approach for resolving the anomaly-
the nationalization of legal services-because it has little support in the legal profession
and even less support in general as a public policy for regulating business. For a defense of
this proposal, see Marvin E. Frankel, Partisan Justice 123-29 (1980).
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competence of the bar in successfully regulating lawyers to guarantee
quality legal services and to ensure dedication to the public good.
-At the opposite end of the spectrum, a pure market approach to
the delivery of legal services could lead to radical changes. This ap-
proach would rely on the self-interest of legal services providers to
provide the public with the best quality services at the lowest cost and
would disdain a community-wide moral vision.2 2 It would end all lim-
its on entry into law practice and reject government (or government-
enforced) licensure or certification.2 3 If consumers found private cer-
tification valuable, market actors would provide it. 4 Government
would intervene only "to do something that the market cannot do for
itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the
game." 235 Presumably, this would include mechanisms for permitting
redress against lawyers who engage in fraud or fail to keep their
promises to clients, courts, and third parties. 236
More appealing than the status quo and market alternatives is a
Middle Range approach. It combines the advantages of a market sys-
tem with a communitarian moral vision and retains a place, though a
limited one, for the current institutions of the bar. Under the Middle
Range approach, the bar could provide its members with a certificate
establishing certain credentials, but not an exclusive license to provide
legal services.3 7 Lawyers and nonlawyers would be able to provide
legal services, but only those admitted to the bar would be able to call
themselves "lawyers."1238 Courts and agencies would be able to re-
quire knowledge of their rules as a prerequisite for practice before
232 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 134-60 (1962); Milton Friedman, The
Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 32 (arguing that companies that worry about social issues are "unwitting
puppets" of socialism, "the intellectual force that has been undermining the basis of a free
society").
233 See Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, supra note 232, at 137-60. Asserting that
consumers are able to evaluate the quality of producers, id. at 147-48, Friedman suggests
that professional licensing inhibits competition and reduces the quantity and quality of
services. Id. at 155-56. In medicine, professional regulation "renders the average quality
of practice low by reducing the number of physicians, by reducing the aggregate number of
hours available from trained physicians for more rather than less important tasks, and by
reducing the incentive for research and development." Id. at 157.
234 Id. at 146-47.
235 Id. at 27.
236 Id. (arguing that proper function of government includes "the maintenance of law
and order to prevent coercion of one individual by another [and] the enforcement of con-
tracts voluntarily entered into").
237 For a comparison of certification and licensing, see id. at 144-45.
238 Cf. 1995 N.Y. Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 175, at 204-05 & n.76 (discussing regula-
tion of mental health professionals in New York where all persons are permitted to provide
therapy but only licensed psychologists are permitted to use the title "psychologist").
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them and might choose to permit admission to the bar or graduation
from a law school239 to qualify individuals to practice.
The government, with input from legal services providers, includ-
ing the bar, would prescribe the ethical or regulatory rules governing
the delivery of legal services. These rules could be the same for law-
yers and nonlawyers, and could include the existing provisions2 40 ex-
cept those limiting competition and prohibiting nonlawyer
participation in the delivery of legal services.241 All legal services
providers would be bound by obligations of competence, confidential-
ity, loyalty, civility, and candor to the court.242 The elimination of the
assumption that lawyers will behave altruistically would probably lead
to rules more protective of consumers, such as requiring written fee
agreements. 243 These rules would be enforced through malpractice
suits and government enforcement. The bar could, of course, choose
to continue some additional form of enforcement in order to assure
superior competence and ethics on the part of its members.
This hybrid approach would permit the community of legal ser-
vices providers to develop a moral aspiration for their work consistent
with the commercial context of law practice and free of the perceived
hypocrisy of the Professionalism Paradigm. The sources for develop-
ing such an ethic already abound in the legal literature, including
Mary Ann Glendon's ethic of craft,244 Anthony Kronman's neo-
Aristotelian lawyer-statesman model,24 5 Thomas Shaffer's religious
perspective,246 Peter Margulies's civic humanism,247 and Anthony Al-
239 Even without the use of law school graduation as a formal qualification, the end of
professional privilege would probably not mean the end of law schools. In the field of
business, for example, which does not have licensing, graduate schools of business serve an
important function in teaching skills and values that prove valuable to business
practitioners.
240 See Rhode, Non-Lawyer Practice, supra note 175, at 231.
241 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 574-76 (discussing Model Rule of Professional
Conduct Rule 5.4, restricting nonlawyer ownership of law firms, as "barrier" to
competition).
242 See, e.g., Rhode, Non-Lawyer Practice, supra note 175, at 231 (suggesting that "[l]ay
practitioners... be held to the same standards of ethical conduct as attorneys regarding
competence, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest").
243 The drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct initially proposed such a
requirement, but the ABA voted to make written fee agreements "preferable" and not
mandatory. ABA Ctr. for Professional Responsibility, The Legislative History of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development in the ABA House of Dele-
gates 39-41 (1987).
244 Glendon, supra note 3.
245 Kronman, supra note 3, at 4.
246 Shaffer, supra note 194. For other religious approaches to the lawyer's role, Includ-
ing my own work, see supra note 194.
247 See Margulies, supra note 192, at 1142-43 (describing civic humanist as one who
seeks synthesis of law and revolution centered on human community).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 70:1229
December 1995] THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM
fieri's postmodern "theoretics of practice."24 The field of business
ethics also offers a fertile source for considering the moral duties of
legal services providers.2 49
An important factor in determining the moral obligations of legal
service providers is the role of their occupation in providing access to
justice. Under the Professionalism Paradigm, the legal profession has
been concerned about the unequal access to justice for low-income
persons, s0 and commentators have observed that, contrary to the goal
of equal justice under law, "justie ... is related to the quality of
lawyering that a client can afford."25' Mitigating that concern is the
condition of altruism under which the legal profession's placement of
obligations to the public above those to clients is presumed to moder-
ate any harms that unrepresented persons will suffer. The Business
Paradigm removes the assumption that legal services providers serve
as such a buffer. It places squarely before the public and providers of
legal services the problem of resolving the conflict between the socie-
tal aspiration of equal justice and a justice system where the ability to
purchase legal services affects the quality of justice a person receives.
The public would either have to limit the goal of equal justice z or
implement reforms, such as increasing funding for free legal services
248 Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note 193, at 2568 (analyzing why poverty law-
yers accept or reject cases). Alfieri is part of a broader theoretics of practice movement.
See generally Foreword to Conference, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progres-
sive Thought and Action, 43 Hastings LU. at xvii, xix (1992) (seeking "to promote the
reciprocal integration of insights between progressive legal theories and the teaching and
practice of law").
249 For discussions on the impact of business ethics in academic and corporate contexts,
see generally Business Ethics: The State of the Art, supra note 219.
2M In 1993, the ABA amended Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
"Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service," to add a specific goal of 50 hours of free legal
services, primarily to persons of limited means or organizations addressing their needs.
See Gillers & Simon, supra note 173, at 204-05. The Committee Report supporting the
amendment urged the bar to increase its pro bono services to the poor because "[t]he
inability of the poor to obtain needed legal services has been well documented." Id. at 309
(excerpting ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Public Service Responsibility, Committee
Report Supporting 1993 Amendment to Rule 6.1 (1993)).
251 Hazard et al., supra note 105, at 1112; see also Robert L Nelson & David M. Trubek,
Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in Law-
yers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices, supra note 35, at 177, 195-96 (noting "the contradiction
between the public role lawyers claim and actually perform," and observing that "legal
services are allocated through the markets and thus their distribution is heavily skewed
towards the interests of the better-off and better organized"); Deborah L Rhode, Institu-
tionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 683 (1994) (l]n a society at least in
principle committed to equal justice under the law, the absence of adequate representation
poses obvious dilemmas for lawyers in adversarial contexts.").
252 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 251, at 685 ("Given the elasticity of legal needs and the
disparity of financial resources among the public generally, equalizing access is an unrealis-
tic aspiration.").
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or restructuring legal transactions so that they are cheaper or able to
be accomplished without the assistance of a lawyer.253
The Middle Range approach diverges from both the self-
regulation and market approaches. Unlike the self-regulation ap-
proach, it rejects both licensing and exclusive lawyer self-policing,
while permitting the organized bar control of lawyer certification. The
Middle Range approach's greater reliance on the market and lesser
deference to the organized bar appears more consistent with treating
law practice as a business. Unlike the market approach, the Middle,
Range approach permits certification and seeks a community ethic be-
yond the market's accommodation of individual self-interest. It both
recognizes values outside those of the market and pragmatically re-
tains a place for the organized bar in the delivery of legal services254
The Middle Range approach may very well offer a number of ad-
vantages over the Professionalism Paradigm. The Middle Range ap-
proach could improve the quality of legal services. Many
commentators have observed that the legal profession is not particu-
larly effective at ensuring that lawyers provide honest or competent
representation.'5 5 Although it appears that significant competition
exists for high-priced legal services,2 6 restrictions on nonlawyer prac-
253 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 562-65 (describing reform proposals).
254 While creating a revolutionary change in world view, new paradigms do borrow ele-
ments from the old. See Kuhn, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that new paradigms "ordinarily
incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that
the traditional paradigm had previously employed" but also observing that these elements
are seldom employed in the traditional way).
255 On competence, see, e.g., Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are
Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
Fordham L. Rev. 227, 234 (1973) ("One-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in
serious cases are not really qualified."); Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profes-
sion's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Per-
spective, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 639, 640 ("No one with any practical experience would deny the
superficiality and shoddiness of much legal work, nor would anyone claim that the bar's
institutions of quality control have provided effective means of self-regulation in the
past."); William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance
Standards and Competent Representation, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181,201 (1984) ("Inade-
quate representation [in criminal cases] is a major institutional problem.").
On dishonesty toward clients, see Lerman, supra note 120, at 699-744 (discussing top-
ics lawyers lie about); Ross, supra note 120, at 12-22 (discussing unethical billing); Richard
Pdrez-Pefia, Lawyers Face Rise in Claims of Corruption, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1, at
35 (noting that "more and more lawyers in New York State are stealing sums of money
from their clients").
On the inadequacy of discipline, see Rhode, supra note 251, at 694-700 (describing
weakness of discipline and malpractice remedies); Nina Bernstein, Crooked Lawyers Pro.
tected; Discipline Slow, Soft, Secretive, Newsday, Jan. 21, 1992, at 4 (lawyer discipline is
"[t]oo slow, too secret, too soft and too self-regulated").
256 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 541 (noting that large corporations have few
problems and many choices in acquiring adequate legal services); Rhode, supra note 251,
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tice and financing of legal services limit competition in providing ser-
vices to low- and middle-income persons.2- 7 Ending professional
privilege will increase competition in this market and lead to better
quality services at a lower cost. 58
The traditional professional view, however, is that increased com-
petition will lead lawyers to cut comers and provide lower quality
services.25 9 That approach is contrary to the market theory that com-
petition leads to the best quality service at the lowest cost. The justifti-
cation~for the professionalism view is that the market cannot function
for legal services because consumers cannot evaluate them.;6o As
noted above, though, sophisticated consumers can evaluate ser-
vices.261 Less sophisticated consumers are not situated any differently
from consumers in many other business transactions, who will pre-
sumably be, able to purchase such information through consumer
guides or paid referral services if they feel they lack the expertise to
make a decision.26 2
Two other factors suggest higher quality services under the Mid-
dle Range approach. First, in a system of certification, the organized
bar itself will face competition from nonlawyers. The bar will need to
ensure the competence of its members in order to demonstrate the
value of certification to the market and will therefore have a greater
incentive-- to police bar members than exists under the bar's current
monopoly. Second, the Middle Range approach continues a system of
regulation. In light-of the bar's inability to demonstrate its capacity to
regulate lawyer conduct successfully to date, the government would
have the authority to regulate the delivery of legal services.3 In ad-
dition, without the assumption of lawyer altruism, the regulations
would probably be more protective of consumers than the existing
ethical codes.
at 725 ("Large scale repeat purchasers may find sufficient assistance through increased use
of audit services, competitive bidding, and monitoring by in-house counsel.").
257 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 556, 575-78 (discussing pros and cons of easing
form-of-practice restrictions to help individual purchasers of legal services); Rhode, supra
note 251, at 725-28 (noting benefit to low- and middle-income persons of more information
about legal services and increased competition in provision of those services).
258 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 251, at 726-28 (suggesting that competition with
nonlawyers and among lawyers would benefit consumers).
259 See supra note 63.
260 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
261 See supra note 227.
262 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 40, at 571 (noting possibility of consumer guides for
law); Rhode, supra note 251, at 725-26 (asserting that "centralized consumer directives
with substantial price and quality information" would allow low- and middle-income pur-
chasers to use legal market more effectively).
263 See Rhode, supra note 251, at 694-700 (discussing problems with self-regulation and
possible avenues for government regulation).
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The Middle Range approach may also enhance lawyers' contribu-
tion to the public good in other ways. First, by providing better qual-
ity services at lower cost, the new paradigm would make legal services
available to more moderate and low-income persons. While it would
not fully provide equal access to legal services, it would provide
greater access than is available under the existing paradigm. The con-
tradiction between the aspiration to equal justice for all and the mar-
ket delivery of legal services would remain. However, as noted above,
where the old paradigm obscured this contradiction, the new one
highlights it and makes this problem one of the Middle Range's prior-
ity problems. Presumably, unless society is willing to concede that
equal justice under law is a myth, highlighting the problem will lead to
some type of solution.264
Second, the Middle Range approach may also increase respect
for the legal system. As noted above, under the existing paradigm, the
elite profession that staffs the legal system appears to the public to be
composed of hypocrites, cynics, or fools. 265 The new paradigm would
remove this taint. It would also broaden responsibility for the legal
system by making the provision of legal services more democratic. 266
Third, the Middle Range approach would enable the develop-
ment of a moral vision of the role of the legal services provider. By
eliminating the Professionalism Paradigm's dichotomy and elements
that so many reject, the Middle Range frees such a dialogue from the
automatic cynicism of many legal service providers and members of
the public. As noted above, sources already existing within the legal
community and the business community offer the basis for developing
a community ethic of service in this new atmosphere. 267
Opponents of the Business Paradigm will argue, to the contrary,
that adoption of the Business Paradigm will decrease the likelihood
that some lawyers will adopt an ethic of service. Indeed, despite wide-
spread rejection of the Business-Profession dichotomy, some lawyers
do believe in it. It may be that the Professionalism Paradigm moti-
vates some of the finest members of the legal community to behave in
an exceptional way. On the other hand, it may also be that these indi-
viduals have a strict personal code of morality that would promote
exceptional conduct regardless of the existence of the Professionalism
264 See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
5 See supra text accompanying note 207.
266 The Business Paradigm provides an opportunity for moving toward what leading
constitutional scholars describe as the "'lawyerhood of all citizens."' Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771, 1776 (1994) (symposium
on Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991)).
267 See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
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Paradigm. Certainly if the legal community succeeded in developing a
community ethic of service, it would influence not only these unusual
individuals, but also many others to whom the Professionalism Para-
digm is empty rhetoric.
Richard Posner has also questioned whether increased competi-
tion will undermine civility and obligations to the court.= Under
both paradigms, legal service providers have similar incentives to
maximize their clients' interests at the expense of civility and candor
to the court. But while the discredited Professionalism Paradigm is
unlikely to provide persuasive grounds to motivate lawyers to civility
and candor, the new paradigm at least offers the potential for creating
credible moral suasion. Although the rules would probably be similar
under both paradigms, independent regulation of discipline under the
new paradigm may be stricter.269 In addition, an organized bar facing
competition from nonlawyers will have both greater incentive to po-
lice itself and greater authority in urging policing of nonlawyers.
One last argument for the superiority of the Professionalism Par-
adigm would be that a self-governing bar is necessary as a bulwark
against arbitrary government authority.270 The argument for this view
is overstated. In practice, the bar does not have the autonomy it
claims under the Professionalism Paradigm. Admission to the bar,
promulgation of ethics rules, and lawyer discipline are generally the
province of the courts.271 While they are composed largely of lawyers,
the courts are still a government entity independent of the bar. More-
over, the conduct of lawyers is currently subject to regulation under
the common law and statutes the promulgation of which the bar does
not control, including tort law, criminal law, agency law, and securities
law.2n While the Professionalism Paradigm does not achieve the au-
tonomy it claims, the Middle Range approach permits a significant
degree of independence. It continues a role of authority for the or-
268 Posner, supra note 34, at 81, 92-93. Posner's view tracks the Profit Maximizer taboo.
See supra notes 63, 121 and accompanying text.
269 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., Rhode. supra note 251, at 688-89 (pointing out drawbacks of external regu-
lation, such as erosion of lawyers' sense of personal responsibility and danger of regulation
becoming captive to group it is regulating); Stimson, supra note 65, at xxii (advocating
independence of bar as protection for liberty).
271 Burnele V. Powell, Open Doors, Open Arms, and Substantially Open Records:
Consumerism Takes Hold in the Legal Profession, 28 Val. U. L Rev. 709,713 (1994) (citing
ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report to the House of Dele-
gates (May 1991) (McKay Report) as support for proposition that legal profession is not
"self-regulated," but rather regulated by judiciary).
272 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 57-154 (2d
ed. 1994) (collecting cases and commentary on relationship between criminal law, tort law,
securities and regulatory law, and procedural law and the regulation of lawyers).
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ganized bar. It also provides a large number of diverse legal services
providers, making it difficult for the State to dominate them.
CONCLUSION
The legal community is poised on the brink of a paradigm shift.
The anomaly arising from the disjunction between the Business-
Profession dichotomy and prevailing perceptions of lawyer conduct
has provoked a crisis for the Professionalism Paradigm. The condi-
tions creating the anomaly, and the indispensability of the dichotomy
to the paradigm's credibility, make it unlikely that it will be possible to
revive the paradigm or bracket this anomaly.
Instead, a new paradigm of law practice as a business is emerging
to resolve the anomaly. While susceptible to a number of institutional
arrangements, the new paradigm offers the potential for a Middle
Range approach that poses an inspiring vision of the legal commu-
nity's potential for better serving clients, enhancing the administration
of justice, and promoting a shared commitment to the common good.
The Middle Range approach provides the legal community with the
opportunity to turn from lamenting the decline of professionalism to
the more important work of improving the delivery of legal services
and promoting justice.
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